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The developing knowledge of life sciences is at the crux of Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake 
as she examines human promise gone awry in a near-future dystopia. This thesis examines 
aspects of posthumanism, ecocriticism, and feminism in the novel’s scientific, cultural, and 
environmental projections. Through the trope of extinction, Atwood’s text foregrounds the 
effects of human exceptionalism and instrumentalism in relation to the natural world, and 
engenders an analysis of human identity through its biological and cultural aspects. Extinction 
thus serves as a metaphor for both human development and human excesses, redefining the idea 
of human within the context of vulnerable species. Oryx and Crake reveals humanity’s organic 
connections with non-human others through interspecies gene-splicing and the ensuing hybridity. 
In this perspective, Atwood’s text provides a dialogue on humankind’s alienation from the natural 
world and synchronic connections to the animal other, and poses timely questions for twenty-
first century consumerism, globalism, and humanist approaches to nature. The loss of balance 
provoked by the apocalyptic situation in Oryx and Crake challenges commonplace attitudes 
toward beneficial progress. This imbalance signals the need for a new narrative: A consilient 
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INTRODUCTION: THE EXTINCTION NARRATIVE 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, humankind expands its knowledge potential, 
peering deep into the universe and far back in time to view events near the birth of the universe, 
and deep into matter and biology to unlock the keys of life. The developing knowledge of life 
sciences provides the foundation for Margaret Atwood’s novel Oryx and Crake as she examines 
human promise gone awry in a near-future dystopia. Processes of embodiment and feedback 
systems illuminate humanity’s organic connections with nonhuman others; this relatedness is the 
key to the interspecies gene-splicing taking place in the novel. In this world, human being is 
redefined in the context of other being, and the posthuman arises through genetic intervention, 
inheriting an earth in which the original humans are virtually extinct.  
The liberal humanist subject’s capacity for both mindful and blind rapaciousness is at the core of 
Oryx and Crake, propelling a near-future scenario in which Homo sapiens is the endangered 
species. But inside the narrative of proposed human extinction rests an acknowledgment of the 
current mass extinction that may be attributable to human activity. In the interstices between 
encroaching mass biosphere extinctions (resulting from global warming and unchecked 
exploitation) and humanity’s extinction (rendered via a bio-engineered doomsday virus), Atwood 
challenges our understanding of the relationship between what we self-name “human” and 
nonhuman others. The same factors enabling cross-species gene transfer firmly embed humans 
within the biology of all earth organisms, making us a creature as knowable by our likenesses as 
by our differences to other life forms, and, similarly, as vulnerable to environmental factors.  
According to N. Katherine Hayles, four criteria inform our understanding of the posthuman: the 
primacy of information over materiality, the relegation of consciousness to second-tier 
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significance, the view of body as “original prosthesis,” and the effortless joining of man and 
machine. This perspective of the posthuman leads to “the union of the human with the intelligent 
machine” as a “common theme” in posthuman philosophy and fiction (2-3). The idea of the 
posthuman is intertwined with critiques of the “liberal humanist subject,” and overlaps post-
colonial and post-modern theories in deconstructing a universal, unified humanist ideal (4). 
While, as Hayles notes, many contemporary philosophers and fiction writers locate the 
posthuman within the union of human and computer, the primary function of information 
processing can also be examined through genetic intervention and re-embodiment. This version 
of the posthuman is the direction Atwood follows in Oryx and Crake, proposing a re-figured 
humanity, adapted for survival through multiple biological interfaces. Atwood’s presentation of 
the posthuman through genetically-modified humans and other creatures challenges the bedrock 
concept of “human” and opens a window for reevaluating non-human agency and sentience. 
At the same time she reveals the biological correlations between humans and nonhumans, 
Atwood highlights the psychological separation between humanity and the natural world, 
apparent in the constructs of human habitat. Oryx and Crake portrays a world altered by global 
warming and devastated by the “JUVE, Jetspeed Ultra Virus Extraordinary” (Atwood, Oryx and 
Crake 341). The world prior to the virus is already in crisis: rapidly rising oceans have inundated 
coastal cities and brought desertification to once lush landscapes (63). The resulting 
environmental and social conditions drive the new elite, the lauded mathematical intellectuals, 
into the “Compounds,” secure company-associated communities that are separated from the 
“pleeblands” (27, 289) by twelve-foot high walls, barbed wire, and paramilitary security guards. 
This segregation bisects society into the haves–those born with the “genius gene”–and the have-
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nots–the “neurotypicals” (194); it also further separates the urban populations of both locations 
from the natural world. The characters of Jimmy, the narrator, and his best friend Crake 
exemplify the new normal, where contact with wild nature is nonexistent, and even domestic pets 
are limited, at least in the sphere of the Compounds, to genetically altered animals.  
By developing these environments and the characters inhabiting them, Atwood poses extinction 
as a metaphor for both aspiring self-knowledge and the countermanding self-destruction, and 
redefines the idea of human in the context of vulnerable species—one among many. She draws 
on current scientific research and theory to explicate potential future environmental scenarios, 
and the technocracy’s disastrous consequences profiled in Oryx and Crake challenge 
commonplace attitudes toward “beneficial” progress. In addition to vanished human and 
nonhuman life, Oryx and Crake raises the specter of other forms of extinction, adding cultural 
constructs, human relationships, biophilia, language, and ethical behavior to the endangered list. 
The recurrent background theme of extinction links humanist approaches to the natural world 
with potential outcomes, exploring roads we are currently traveling. 
The protagonist, Jimmy/Snowman, and his best friend, Crake, are complementary figures, each 
representing a different facet of the humanist model.1 J. Brooks Bouson cites them “as paired 
opposites,” noting that Oryx and Crake highlights “the division between the humanities and the 
sciences” (140). The realm of humanity’s creative potential through artistic endeavor is 
Jimmy/Snowman’s domain; this is opposed to Crake’s embodiment of empirical rationalist 
thought. Both iterations of humanism owe their birth to the self-absorption and self-congratulation 
                                                 
1 “Jimmy” is the narrator’s name prior to the extinction event which destroys humanity; “Snowman” (as in 
Abominable Snowman) is the appellation Jimmy assumes after the disaster (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 346-47).  
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of western culture. While Oryx and Crake can be seen as deconstructive of the empirical model, it 
can also be read as questioning the efficacy of Jimmy/Snowman’s brand of humanism. Atwood 
herself admits to the text presenting a cautionary tale along the lines of Charles Dickens’ A 
Christmas Carol (qtd. in Halliwell 260), but—intentionally or not—it also points to the culpability 
of those who unquestioningly follow scientific and technological advances.  
In his passive acquiescence, Jimmy/Snowman represents an indictment of western culture which, 
sated on material possessions and hedonistic urges, accepts global warming, genetic mutations, 
and extinction as inevitable progress. In addition to exemplifying the humanist tradition, 
Jimmy/Snowman personifies the estrangement between modern western humanity and nature. 
Even though he claims empathy, he is ill-suited for the post-apocalyptic world of resurgent 
nature, which includes manufactured as well as naturally evolved organisms. Exploring the 
ethics of contemporary genetic engineering through the altered creatures, Atwood gives 
humanoid Crakers and nonhumans such as pigoons and rakunks prominence in the text. Food 
animals, companion species, and genetically modified humans enter the narrative, furthering the 
ethical examination of human technological advances, and posing timely questions for twenty-
first century consumerism, globalism, and commercialism. 
While the complementary male characters of Jimmy/Snowman and Crake help define the 
struggle between the related and contrasting humanist and empirical traditions in the novel, the 
female characters of Jimmy’s mother, Sharon, and his lover, Oryx, illuminate the struggle 
between humans and nature in terms of progress and colonization. Within these two figures, we 
can discern several layers of categorization inherent in western thought. Sharon, born, educated, 
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and normalized into a liberal western society, encounters troubling and obfuscating structures in 
the empirical heritage of the Compounds. Oryx, in contrast, is an enigmatic figure grounded only 
in a digital universe and Snowman’s imagination, and defined by her sexuality.  Reminiscent of 
her feminist observations in The Handmaid’s Tale, Atwood places the women of Oryx and 
Crake in positions that raise issues of social, political, and ethical responsibilities for all genders.  
Sharon illuminates a second-wave and ecofeminist perspective, questioning and then actively 
challenging the corporate, patriarchal power structure of the Compounds and their malefic 
attitude toward the natural world. Oryx represents a third-world female experience; hers is a 
story of survival in the margins of a system that views indigenes as just another commodity for 
consumption.  
Since the publication of Oryx and Crake in 2003, various critics have provided insight and 
analysis from multiple perspectives. Danette DiMarco notes that the figure of Crake “emerges as 
the quintessential homo faber,” illustrating the instrumentalism Atwood critiques in the text 
(171). DiMarco argues that Atwood raises the possibility of counteracting this instrumentalism 
through positive social change as enacted by Jimmy/Snowman (172). Jayne Glover comments on 
Crake’s instrumentalism through an ecocritical perspective, analyzing his “hyperseparation from 
the Other, both from nature and from people in general” (55, 59). Bouson examines the biotech, 
posthuman angles of the novel, exploring the satiric commentary Atwood aims at current 
transgenic research, noting how the figures of Crake and Snowman become jokester and “human 
joke” in Atwood’s bleak humor (140, 151). Looking to the mythic aspects of the novel, Grayson 
Cooke observes the technical role of “language and writing” as a link to the “beginning and end 
of ‘life’ and the ‘human’ as they are commonly understood” (106), and Chung-Hao Ku interprets 
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the varying aspects of monstrosity in Atwood’s text, from the pathetic figure of Snowman, to the 
inhuman Crakers, to human science through the figure of Crake: all speak of “the soft boundary 
between human and monster” (109).  
While I do not necessarily disagree with these critics, I argue that Oryx and Crake is also a 
dialogue contrasting humanity’s simultaneous alienation from the natural world and homologous 
connections to the animal other. Oryx and Crake merits a consilient evaluation, recognition that 
humans are both biological and cultural beings.2 This reading ties Atwood’s novel to fictive, 
theoretical, and scientific texts through the mechanism of the extinction narrative. My analysis 
explores Oryx and Crake through the lens of the various forms of extinction, using posthumanist, 
ecocritical, and feminist theory to illuminate the threads that define both estrangement and affinity. 
In the following pages I will call on posthumanist perspectives from N. Katherine Hayles, Donna 
Haraway, Jean François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, and Bill Readings, among others. These 
theorists allow room in the definition of the posthuman to include an organic interface and 
recognition of the animal other, a concept that takes flight in Atwood’s cast of human and 
nonhuman characters. This viewpoint of posthumanism also segues into areas of ecocritical and 
ecofeminist thought, and here the further works of Haraway, as well as texts by Caroline Merchant, 
Patrick Murphy, Richard Louv, and E. O. Wilson provide supporting insights.  
The interrelationships of the various theories as applied to Oryx and Crake help clarify Atwood’s 
text; for instance, genetic modifications of plants, animals, and especially humans blur the 
                                                 
2 Glen Love explains the interdisciplinary use of science in evaluating literature as a core principle of ecocriticism, 
citing scientific “methods of investigation as the best means we have for understanding our world, and for thinking 
our way toward solutions to the problems of pollution, population, and despoliation” (561).  E. O. Wilson argues 
that “There has never been a better time for collaboration between scientists and philosophers, especially where they 
meet in the borderlands between biology, the social sciences, and the humanities” (Consilience 11).  
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defining lines between species and call for a reconfiguration of the meaning of “human.” This is 
a primary conversation in posthumanism, but the ethics of genetic manipulation place Atwood’s 
discussion in the realm of ecocritical thought as well. I argue that Oryx and Crake challenges the 
information-only existence of the posthuman outside nature, as the extinction of humanism 
Atwood describes parallels the self-contaminating death of informatics. In this rendering, the 
posthuman cannot fully emerge while humanism still filters language, culture, and social 
organizations, and during the dissolution of humanism the cyborgian tools for creating the 
digitized posthuman are sacrificed as well. All that are left are the vestiges of original humans 












CHAPTER ONE: ENDANGERED SPECIES 
An Armageddon is approaching at the beginning of the third millennium. But it is 
not the cosmic war and fiery collapse of mankind foretold in sacred scripture. It is 
the wreckage of the planet by an exuberantly plentiful and ingenious humanity. 
(xxiii) 
E. O. Wilson, 
The Future of Life 
The balance of nature is not a status quo; it is fluid, ever shifting, in a constant 
state of adjustment. Man, too, is part of this balance. Sometimes the balance is in 
his favor; sometimes—and all too often through his own activities—it is shifted to 
his disadvantage. (246) 
Rachel Carson, 
Silent Spring 
Antecedents: A History of Earthly Destruction 
In the rhythm of natural processes, the concept of extinction, when it penetrates, bears the 
disquietude of unending loss. Extinction, after all, is final; after termination, it is beyond human 
control. It is a rather recent idea in history, arriving a little over two hundred years ago, and it 
still provokes resistance with many lay people when placed in human terms.3 Dinosaurs are 
easily understood as gone from the earth in a permanent way, disappearing long before humans 
could interfere or question their existence. Dodos and the giant moa slide into our consciousness 
as forever gone, and we understand human complicity in their disappearance. The “vast armies 
of the passenger pigeons” are similarly understood as extinct through human agency, as John 
Burroughs recounts in his journal:  
The last great flight of them that I ever beheld was on the 10th of April, 1875, 
when, for the greater part of the day, one could not at any movement look 
skyward above the Hudson River Valley without seeing several flocks, great and 
small, of the migrating birds . . . The pigeons never came back. (213)   
                                                 
3 According to research by D.A. Poling and E.M. Evans, the concept of human extinction as an inevitability is still 
not readily accepted by lay-adults, even when they acknowledge the possibility of extinction. Poling and Evans 
surmise the idea of inevitability “may be psychologically overwhelming” (380).    
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Burroughs further notes that he, himself, may have participated by perhaps “killing the last 
pigeon” (213). Though some mourn these human-caused extinctions, all too often the perception 
is distanced by the lens of human exceptionalism: the nonhuman, in the context of extinction, is 
an unfortunate but unavoidable loss due to the inevitability of human progress.  
Evolutionary biologists tell us that of all the different kinds of life that have existed on earth, an 
estimated 99% have gone extinct.4 Some have disappeared through catastrophic events, such as 
the asteroid which is believed to have contributed to the disappearance of the dinosaurs, but most 
have simply succumbed to natural processes over time. The panoply of life we see today is just a 
slice off the end of the temporal column, a thin flake bounded by human awareness. There is 
little doubt that for most creatures, the natural destiny is extinction. Nonetheless, most 
extinctions occur gradually, over time, and not in the rapid tumble initiated since the appearance 
of humans. We may be the next catastrophic event.5 But even with overwhelming evidence of 
the fragility and ephemeral quality of species longevity, the idea of eventual human extinction is 
inconceivable. Perhaps that is why it is such an effective literary tool, one that has been put forth 
by numerous fiction writers. Eliminating humans introduces a defamiliarization, and a world 
without people is an alien landscape: an unfilled promise. After all, according to most religions 
and some philosophies, the earth was created specifically for people. By introducing the idea of 
human absence, extinction narratives subvert humanism, religion, and science: man the thinker, 
man the chosen one, man the maker is no more.  
                                                 
4 See Ayala (8572), Garrison (618), and Jablonski (589). 
5 Michael Boulter states that human “use of fossil fuels and . . . disrespect for the environment are combining to 
cause unprecedented falls in numbers of individuals of many species” (35), and Wilson asserts that “species of 
plants and animals are disappearing a hundred or more times faster than before the coming of humanity” (xxiii).
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In “The Handmaid’s Tale and Oryx and Crake in Context,” Atwood defines her novels as 
speculative rather than science fiction (513). Nonetheless, Oryx and Crake fits inside a long 
tradition of science fiction narratives that entertain Earth’s destruction as a means to an end. 
Oryx and Crake‘s antecedents include Nevil Shute’s On The Beach, Pat Frank’s Alas, Babylon, 
Walter M. Miller Jr.’s A Canticle for Liebowitz, the film Planet of the Apes, Lester del Rey’s 
“The Faithful,” John Wyndham’s The Day of the Triffids, Greg Bear’s Blood Music, and the 
films Twelve Monkeys and Deep Impact. These narratives imagine different scenarios, such as a 
post nuclear-holocaust world, various forms of biological plagues and bioengineered menaces, 
and civilization-destroying natural disasters, but all imagine an earth bereft of a successful, 
plentiful human species.  
Some science fiction imagines simple survival after an extinction event (Alas Babylon, Deep 
Impact), while others (“The Faithful,” Planet of the Apes, Blood Music) envision a radically 
different reconstruction of reality. Atwood’s narrative combines both scenarios: simple survival 
for Jimmy/Snowman and at least four other humans, and a new form of humanoid life in the 
posthuman Crakers. While some of the natural disasters invoked in extinction narratives cannot 
be attributed to mankind (such as asteroids), many of the other triggers are clearly due to 
humans. In some cases it is humanism’s drive for ever-increasing knowledge, while in others it is 
the western ideal of progress in the form of expansion and colonialism, or humankind’s long 
tradition of warring territoriality. In Oryx and Crake, ambition cloaked in the guise of human 
progress justifies war and weaponry, environmental desecration, and misguided medical 
research. Some stories, such as del Rey’s “The Faithful,” revert to humanist outcomes or seem to 
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justify humanist paradigms, but Oryx and Crake dissects humanism under a posthuman 
microscope, exploring the limits of invention, awareness, and justice.  
Atwood combines two extinction-level events in Oryx and Crake—global warming and a lethal 
virus—to achieve the demise of Homo sapiens. While she admits to absorbing some science 
fiction while growing up, such as H.G. Wells, Ray Bradbury, and John Wyndham (Atwood, “The 
Handmaid’s Tale and” 514), she also credits more traditional literary sources as inspiration, 
listing Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, George Orwell’s 1984, and Evgenii Zemiatin’s We as 
examples of a “kind of utopian thinking” with roots in the Bible’s Book of Revelations: “first 
catastrophe, then blissful wonderfulness” (qtd. in Halliwell 257-58). Whether prompted by angst 
over humanity’s sins of greed, avarice, and gluttony, Cold War fears of technology run amok, or 
apprehension concerning environmental disaster, a humanity-scoured globe provides a clean 
substrate for a new beginning.  
This idyllic premise offers another chance at Eden’s garden, an opportunity to undo whatever evil 
humanity has produced. Stephanie Turner views “The apocalyptic mode of expression” as 
essentially “utopian,” an opportunity for “imagining of what happens after” (58), but Atwood’s 
rendering of the future of life is an uneasy projection: it represents the dissolution of human culture 
as we understand it. Her post-apocalypse pictures not the death of a group of individuals, but of 
humanity as a species. Even if a few humans survive, because of depleted surface metals they 
could not rise above a stone age level; thus, “it’s game over forever” for civilization as we 
understand it (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 223). In this regard, the novel acts as a warning for the 
present. Jayne Glover posits that science fiction literature, in its “use of thought experiments,” is an 
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effective means of entering the eco-critical discourse and provoking awareness of “the potential 
consequences of our current ecological crisis” (51). Furthermore, as Coral Ann Howells notes in 
her discussion of Oryx and Crake, “the primary function of a dystopia” may be “to send out danger 
signals to its readers” (161). Atwood herself said in an interview with Martin Halliwell, “if nothing 
changes and we keep doing what we’re doing, we are heading for the perfect storm,” a confluence 
of factors which will take the ensuing events far beyond our control (260).  
Humanity’s Turn 
Dystopias are natural frames of estrangement, scenarios that detach us from our sense of the 
normal. But Oryx and Crake’s dystopic future also indicts contemporary alienation, the rift 
human culture has instituted between itself and the natural world. Poet Gary Snyder describes 
this separation as a “priapic drive for material accumulation” enacted by “men . . . working out 
their ultimate destinies (paradise? perdition?) with planet earth as the stage for the drama—trees 
and animals as mere props, nature a vast supply depot” (103). Dysfunctional examples of the 
division abound in Oryx and Crake: from the nature-less pleeblands to the synthetic creations of 
the Compounds, untampered nature is held apart as Other and as raw material. Only after the 
JUVE epidemic is Jimmy/Snowman confronted with unadulterated nature. 
Snowman is the lone human survivor of the virus (as far as he knows); he is the “Lonesome 
George” of the human species, the lonely remainder of his kind.6 His memories are the only 
tools the reader has of reconstructing the species, and with those Snowman fills in the gaps of the 
pre-JUVE world. Through Snowman’s recollections we see the walled enclave Compounds and 
                                                 
6 Lonesome George, the Galápagos tortoise, is “the lone survivor of the abingdoni subspecies from Pinta Island” 
(Caccone et al. 13223).  
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overcrowded urban pleeblands, both artificial environments that isolate humans from the natural 
world. We also see the political and social changes that humanity experiences as it faces global 
warming: frequent and severe droughts and resultant food scarcities, increasingly virulent 
diseases, self-serving oligarchies, segmentation and segregation of humans by intellect, and 
bioengineered animals for increased food production and medical organ harvesting. DiMarco 
describes the bipartite social segregation as a “systemic acceptance of separation and enclosure 
from communities and people not engaged in similar work”; this segregation amplifies 
economic, intellectual, and political divisions of power (177). The division of western society 
into a “false dichotomy” of beneficial Compound life and dysfunctional pleebland existence, 
according to Glover, “highlights the darker side of utopia and the ambiguous nature of dystopia” 
(54). By emphasizing the Compounds’ authoritarian regime and the pleeblands’ borderless 
nature, each human location is shown to be more, and less, than it seems.  
The extensive information Snowman provides on pre-plague humanity contrasts with the limited 
tableau he presents of the nonhuman world. We can deduce the reason for his lack of knowledge 
or connection with nature once we examine the environment that formed his understanding, the 
Compounds. The walled city-states of the corporate Compounds have replaced the national 
government, doing away with the illusion of a free elective democracy. Those who control the 
biosciences and generate the profits are the royalty of this new society, and their isolation in the 
Compounds is justified because the world outside has “Too much hardware, too much software, 
too many hostile bioforms, too many weapons of every kind, and too much fanaticism and bad 
faith” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 28). Security from infectious vectors spread by competing 
corporations is the rationale behind the enclosures; this security promises a sterile environment 
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that precludes the natural world as well as suspect humans (19, 32, 53, 197). The cynical 
spectacle of a government and legal system with a primary focus of profits is manifested in the 
types of crime the official enforcement arm—the CorpsSeCorps—is vested in controlling: 
saboteurs, environmental and social justice activists, and protesters. Ethics are subject to 
productivity in the world of the Compounds, and genetic manipulation or any other research is 
only judged through the lens of market worth. Those who question or reject this paradigm are 
considered traitors “to the general good,” and dealt with by execution, as in the case of Crake’s 
father and Jimmy’s mother (212, 258).  
Inside the Compounds, both nature and culture are re-sculpted into simulacra, faux constructions 
like the “fake Georgian and fake Tudor and fake French provincial” houses, with complementary 
replica furniture (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 227). Since real food is scarce, soy-based substitutes 
dressed to appear as many different dishes are considered normal fare. Indicating his awareness 
of the fabrication, Crake intones, “You never know . . . What is reality?” (83). The Compounds 
themselves have names that trouble reality, such as “OrganInc Farms,” “NooSkins,” 
“HelthWyzer,” and “RejoovenEsense,” names that hint at their purpose under a persuasive gloss 
(22, 53, 225). But the question of authenticity looms largest with genetically modified biological 
organisms, since the only nature Jimmy and Crake experience first-hand is the manipulated 
nature inside the Compounds.  
It may be possible to understand the building blocks of life, as do the Compound’s scientists, 
without achieving the affinity with nature that is part of our evolutionary history. Some theorists 
insist that exposure to wild, untamed nature is necessary for our very health, producing an 
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“innate tendency to focus upon life and lifelike forms, and in some instances to affiliate with 
them emotionally,” a reaction known as “biophilia” (Wilson, The Future 134). In Oryx and 
Crake, biophilia is rare, and children understand by a very young age that nature is something to 
be tricked and consumed. “When he was old enough” Jimmy learns about his father’s job bio-
engineering pigs into organ banks in the process by which pigs became pigoons. The financial 
implications of the project—“A great deal of investment money had gone into OrganInc 
Farms”—are stressed (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 22-23). Thus, biology and profit are united, and 
nature is quantified as a utilitarian commodity.   
Children who are nature deprived, Richard Louv asserts, suffer from a condition he describes as 
“nature deficit disorder” (34). “Nature,” he indicates, “offers something that the street or gated 
community or computer game cannot”; it “exposes the young directly and immediately to the 
very elements from which humans evolved” (97). Jimmy’s enclosed, computer-entertained 
experience is normal in the pre-JUVE world; he epitomizes a western way of life unengaged 
with nature. His distancing is part of the enculturation process he experiences as a child, a 
process not only severing him from directly experiencing uncontrolled nature, but also numbing 
him to any real connection with the humans in his life. Patrick Murphy recognizes this kind of 
disassociation as “a belief in the radical independence of human beings from all else, including 
each other,” and a view that facilitates denial in “all ongoing human interrelationship with the 
rest of nature” as well as the human place in evolutionary processes (144). 
The artificiality of Jimmy’s experience is clear in his earliest memory of “a huge bonfire” of 
burning cows, sheep, and pigs, animals that have been infected with a man-made virus (Atwood, 
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Oryx and Crake 15). He feels empathy for the animals “because they were being burned and 
surely that would hurt them” (18). He is later introduced to some live pigoons, which are 
“slightly frightening . . . They glanced up at him as if they saw him, really saw him, and might 
have plans for him later” (26). But regardless of the impression of agency the pigoons leave, 
these interactions are veiled with the commodified, objectified status of the nonhuman. Jimmy’s 
childhood contains no recollections of Boy Scout camping trips, journeys to national parks, or 
even unguided play in the woods. The “golf course and lily ponds had been their hunting 
grounds” on Jimmy’s grade-school field trips (148), limiting the children’s exposure to a 
controlled version of nature. The idea of controlling nature is at heart a humanist ideal: “The 
image of nature that became important in the early modern period,” according to Carolyn 
Merchant, “was that of a disorderly and chaotic realm to be subdued and controlled” (127). In the 
Compounds, nature is simply the raw material from which humans fashion a consumer culture.  
The direction of western culture understood as progress has been a trajectory away from natural 
connections, and human economies are built on using, not knowing nature. Jimmy receives most 
of his knowledge of wild animals from “old DVDs” he watched as a child, “those animal-
behaviour programs featuring copulation and growling and innards, and mothers licking their 
young”; he cannot comprehend why “he found them so reassuring” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 
10). He recalls that he never cared for the birds he saw on the field trips, and “he never swam in 
the sea as a child”; his constrained exposure endows him with neither mastery nor a biophilic 
relationship with unhampered nature. For Jimmy, nature is punishing, dangerous, and 
frightening—“who knows what may infest the lagoon?” (6). By the time Jimmy is a teenager, 
biophiliacs are pushed to the edges of society, and either manifest in overt protest, as in the 
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group known as “God’s Gardeners” (257), or in covert internet entities such as “MaddAddam” 
(216-17). Nature deficit disorder, reproduced on a society-wide scale, has emerged as a culture in 
which all nature is commodified, valued only as seed stock in corporate ventures. Extinction thus 
can be seen as a form of alienation as well as the traditional idea of non-being. Organisms go 
extinct (when not simply hunted into extinction) through environmental degradation or loss of 
habitat. The artificial environments humans create are no protection from extinction; in fact, they 
are a primary factor in the demise of a humanity estranged not just from the external world, but 
from itself as well. 
Home, Alone 
Sharon, Jimmy’s mother, recognizes the artificiality and the “theme park” atmosphere of this 
privileged lifestyle, where a safe existence precludes notions of privacy and liberty and includes 
strip searches by hostile guards (27, 53). A significant figure in Snowman’s memories, she 
stands as another source of loss. Sharon emerges as an endangered species through both her 
inability to function as a maternal figure, and as the voice of ethics against the Compound 
mentality. Disconnected from her child, she is too preoccupied and angry with what she knows 
of the Compounds’ actions to notice Jimmy’s need, and although her “mother-figure functions as 
the ethical conscience of the text” (Fiona 279), Sharon does not project unconditional motherly 
consistence into her role. A microbiologist formerly employed by the Compound, she leaves her 
job to “stay home with” Jimmy about the time he starts first grade (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 30). 
At times, Jimmy remembers, “She was like a real mother,” but “those moods of hers didn’t last 
long” (30). More often, her response is “the flat voice, the blank eyes, the tired staring out of the 
window” (32). This most un-maternal of actors chooses to give up the agency, power, and 
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prestige of her Compound job to stay home with a school-bound child, a move that renders her 
suspect in both her child’s and the Compound’s eyes.  
Jimmy’s most prevalent recollections of his parents involve bitter fights; knowing what comes 
after, it seems Jimmy’s role in life is to witness not just tragedy, but the keys to tragedy as well. 
Sharon intimates the questionable nature of the biological research going on in the Compounds 
when she accuses Jimmy’s father of engaging in “immoral . . . sacrilegious” actions (57). That 
Crake will later take similar knowledge to construct a doomsday virus is adequate proof to the 
verity of her claim, but at the time Jimmy’s father challenges her intelligence and judgment, 
asserting human intellectual primacy over any spiritual concerns: “It’s just proteins . . . there’s 
nothing sacred about cells and tissue.” Sharon remembers wanting to make “life better for 
people—not just people with money,” a vision not in keeping with the Compound philosophy 
(57). DiMarco explains that Sharon’s “stance . . . marginalizes her and ultimately marks her as a 
subversive” (189), a deadly categorization in the context of the corporate state.  
As Jimmy recalls, several years later his mother abandons the family, but a clear understanding 
of why she leaves is not apparent until much later, when Crake reveals how his father died. The 
pharmaceutical companies that own the Compounds are in the business of dealing death as well 
as life: they manufacture illnesses to assure steady market demand. As Crake relates to Jimmy, 
“They put the hostile bioforms into their vitamin pills—their HelthWyzer over-the-counter 
premium brand” with a “really elegant delivery system” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 211). 
“Elegant” signifies clever scientific manipulation in the “patronizing jargon the math nerds used” 
(142); in this connection, the Compound geniuses are fooling the rest of the population into 
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illness and disease.7 Crake’s father, who discovers what is happening, is pushed off an overpass 
because he is about to blow the whistle, and it is likely that Jimmy’s mother runs away because 
she knows similar information and understands the related danger (213).  
Sharon’s disappearance establishes the void of extinction, but for Jimmy the process is a drawn-
out progression of estrangement. He loses his mother over many years, and even after she leaves 
the loss continues, as the CorpsSeCorps questions him regularly attempting to find her. He sees 
her only twice again, both times on film, once during “the blockade of the Happicuppa head-
office compound in Maryland” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 181), and once in front of a firing 
squad. The use of film to resurrect Jimmy’s dead mother mirrors the nature videos he 
experienced as a boy: both provide false evidence of something no longer existing in reality. 
They are shadow images produced through human manipulation, vulgar effigies which attempt 
but fail to mask the finality of extinction. In the execution video, Sharon says “Remember 
Killer” before she is gunned down (258), a reminder that she had taken Jimmy’s pet rakunk with 
her when she left the family, for the purpose of “liberating her” (61). This revives another loss, 
that of an entity “quite important to him” (Atwood, qtd. in Halliwell 254). As a child, Jimmy is 
not allowed a puppy or kitten as a pet because of the tight security against diseases which might 
affect the bioengineered animals; instead, his father brings home a rakunk, a gene-spliced mix of 
raccoon and skunk (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 32, 51). Jimmy names her “Killer,” and she is the 
one constant in his life: “She always forgave him” (60). After Sharon has run away, Jimmy is not 
sure whether he is mourning “His mother, or an altered skunk” more—an indication of the weak 
                                                 
7 As the term is used in the scientific community, “elegance” is “the parsimonious and evocative description of 
pattern to make sense out of a confusion of detail” (Wilson, Consilience 219). 
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connection between him and his mother, and the extinction of affection which had already 
eroded their relationship (61).  
The Death of Words 
When Jimmy graduates high school and goes to college, he enters another nature antagonistic 
environment, the pleeblands. These urban centers are not walled, but “so boundless, so porous, 
so penetrable, so wide open. So subject to chance” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 196). Since the 
elite social class has flown to the Compounds, those who are left in the pleeblands are the 
neurotypicals, unvalued since they are not mathematical geniuses (194). Jimmy leaves one very 
prestigious cage for another form of containment, a few steps down on the social register. 
Neither site offers the connections with nature that would overcome nature deficit disorder. 
Jimmy’s college is the Martha Graham Institute, a former “Arts-and-Humanities” college that 
now advertises “Our Students Graduate with Employable Skills” (186-88). Cultural pursuits are 
the endangered species at Martha Graham, as right-brain students struggle to establish value in a 
left-brain world. Art, “all that’s left over” of a culture when everything else is gone (167), has 
been devalued as not commercially viable. The disappearance of the cultural arts is attributed in 
part to the digital revolution, as production capabilities have been brought within reach of the 
layman. “Anyone with a computer could splice together whatever they wanted,” Jimmy explains, 
“or digitally alter old material, or create new animations.” The mystique of creativity is “no 
longer central to anything” (187). Music, dance, visual arts, and literature are reduced to 
peripheral talents, fading as rapidly as the disappearing biota.  
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Jimmy, weak in math and science, is thus considered a “dull-normal”; a word person, he 
represents the remains of the humanist subject (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 50, 25). In his pre-
JUVE life, Jimmy has an affectation for archaisms—words no longer used, nor of any value to 
anyone. This loss of language is another form of extinction, of utterances passing through a 
culture, then discarded unwanted. For Jimmy, these old words contain “a precision and 
suggestiveness that no longer had a meaningful application in today’s world.” He acquires 
“strangely tender feeling[s]” regarding  words he pulls from ancient books in the Martha Graham 
library, such as “wheelwright, lodestone, saturnine” and “adamant”; it is “as if they were 
children abandoned in the woods and it was his duty to rescue them” (195). But Jimmy’s 
attraction to words begins much earlier than Martha Graham, and he is borrowing words like 
“vile” from his parent’s fights while still a child (60). As an adolescent watching online sites, he 
is entranced by “At Home With Anna K.” because of her recitations of Shakespeare: “Think 
what he might not have known if it hadn’t been for her. Think of the words. Sere, for instance. 
Incardine” (85).  
One of Jimmy’s girlfriends, Amanda Payne, extends the metaphor of dying words with her 
artwork, a form she calls “Vulturizing” (245). It involves “a truckload of large dead animal 
parts” arranged in the shape of four letter words in a vacant field, which she photographs from a 
helicopter once they are covered in vultures (244). She selects the words “with care,” and “So far 
she’d done PAIN . . . WHOM, and then GUTS.” Whereas Jimmy is concerned with salvaging 
complex, historical words, Amanda is content with murdering simple words; her work brings 
“them to life . . . and then it kill[s] them” (245).  
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The Crakers also play a part in the loss of language, as the old words have no context for them. 
Even with Snowman as teacher and the Crakers as avid students, some ideas cannot be 
transversed. When he tries to explain the meaning of a simple word to them, such as “toast,” it 
only raises more questions: the Crakers have no concept of manufactured food, agriculture, or 
technology (48). Human civilization does not exist in their frame of reference, so there is no 
commonality upon which to base understanding. They “would hear him,” as Howells observes, 
“but with brains from which passion and imagination have been erased, they would not 
understand him” (172). Jimmy recognizes that even if he writes a diary, “he’ll have no future 
reader,” not only because of the Crakers’ inability to read, but also because of their lack of 
connection to his reality: “Any reader he can possibly imagine is in the past” (41).  
The antiquated utterances he keeps repeating to himself frame the dissolution of humanistic 
integrity and disappearing ideals, and as such play a role in the extinction of culture. The words 
are communication artifacts, leftovers from a dead civilization and remnants of the human 
species. Even Snowman finds himself losing the meaning of some words, such as “Mesozoic,” a 
word which “He can see” and “hear,” but which “he can’t reach . . . He can’t attach anything to 
it” (39). Without a reader and without a listener, the language of humanity is reduced to bare 
essentials. As Cooke points out, “Atwood suffuses her book with the sense of a lament for 
language, for words, and for the creative endeavours conducted with words” (120). In his solitary 
last-man state, Jimmy tries to hold onto the words, but they keep evaporating, disappearing like 
the lost culture they denote.  
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Extinction, the Game 
Atwood presents the human role in extinction through two proxies: “Blood and Roses” and 
“EXTINCTATHON” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 78, 80). The games are part of a suite of internet 
venues Atwood uses to illustrate the alienating and dehumanizing potential of online 
entertainment. Through this online universe, Jimmy’s ideas of reality take form. With no 
supervision and Crake’s hacking ability, the boys have a virtual tour through an online 
environment filled with child porn, live executions, assisted suicide, and animal snuff sites. They 
gain the understanding that life is cheap, seemingly worth only its entertainment value to a jaded 
western audience. The sites have names like “Felicia’s Frog Squash,” “hedsoff.com,” 
“brainfrizz.com,” and “nitee-nite.com” (82-83). The games include “computer chess or Three-
Dimensionals,” “Kwiktime Osama,” and “Barbarian Stomp” (77). But the boys’ favorite games 
are the online multi-player games Blood and Roses and Extinctathon (78, 80).  
Blood and Roses and Extinctathon, in which Jimmy and Crake become immersed, rely on a 
player’s knowledge of human and natural history, respectively. The parallelism of Blood and 
Roses and Extinctathon can be seen mirroring the partition of the humanities and science; 
similarly, the boys’ relationship infers the dichotomy of the two branches of knowledge.8 Neither 
Jimmy nor Crake understand the other’s predilection; Jimmy’s job of “wordserf” is one he is 
sure “Crake would despise,” while Crake’s research “might not be something Jimmy could 
understand any more” (253). Crake’s disdain for the kind of knowledge in which Jimmy 
                                                 
8 Wilson recognizes the contemporary forms of “the great branches of learning . . . natural sciences, social sciences, 
and the humanities” as arising from “the unified Enlightenment vision generated during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.” He views increasing separation and specialization since that time as an impediment to 
consilience, “the unification of knowledge”  (Consilience 37, 40). 
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excels—crafting words to shape meaning—is matched by Jimmy’s hopelessness in the face of 
ever matching up to the “math-and-chem-and-applied-bio yardstick” important in the 
Compounds (50).  
Blood and Roses matches contestants in a recitation of cultural accomplishments versus human 
destruction, and winners gain points by accumulating “human achievements”: “The Divine 
Comedy. Greek statuary. Aqueducts. Paradise Lost.” All the gains are overcome, though, by 
“The Vikings. The Crusades. Ghengis Khan” or “Attila the Hun” (79). No points are earned 
unless a suitable number of people die and the player can remember the quantity of corpses 
because the game demands “atrocities on a large scale” (78-79). Jimmy observes the “Blood 
player usually won” because “it was easier to remember the Blood stuff,” but he keeps to himself 
the fact he suffers “severe nightmares” after playing (80). Jimmy is adept at Blood and Roses, 
scoring some wins against Crake, but he is also sensitive to the implications that whole human 
cultures are vulnerable to the same threats his beloved archaic words face: they are temporary 
phenomena, brief flares against repetitive darkness.  
“EXTINCTATHON, Monitored by MaddAddam,” rewards players for knowledge of plant or 
animal extinctions “within the past fifty years,” and those who achieve a score of three thousand 
earn the title Grandmaster (80, 214). While Blood and Roses illuminates the futility of human 
creativity under the overwhelming human propensity for self-destruction, Extinctathon makes 
visible the sheer quantity of human-advanced extinctions: the computer printout is “a couple 
hundred pages of fine print and filled with obscure bugs, weeds, and frogs nobody had ever 
heard of,” and memorable to no one except the Grandmasters, who have “brains like search 
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engines” (81). Atwood’s projection mirrors the claims of contemporary biologists, who estimate 
declines in biotic diversity by a scale of fifty percent by century’s end if current trends continue.9  
Under the auspices of extinction, Atwood establishes a dialogue on the Adamic prerogative of 
naming: the gateway to the Extinctathon website proclaims “Adam named the living animals, 
MaddAddam names the dead ones” (80). Scientific knowledge rests on understanding nature 
through identification and categorization, management processes initiated and codified through 
classical and Enlightenment thinkers. The basic Aristotelian principles of classification are 
developed by Carolus Linneaus in the eighteenth century into the nomenclature system that 
appears in the “Latin names” of Extinctathon’s “Phylum Class Order Family Genus Species” 
(80-81). By sequestering the naming principle, MaddAddam is usurping institutional power from 
the Compound scientists, a power that extends to “customizing” the animals in secret, subversive 
activities. MaddAddam’s modifications rebut Compound gene-splicing for profit, alternatively 
producing creatures such as “microbe[s] that [eat] the tar in asphalt” which are used in disruptive 
acts of protest (216). 
Extinctathon players must adopt a designation from the ranks of extinct animals, names from 
creatures that, like Jimmy’s archaic words, are no longer valued nor mourned in the world of the 
Compounds. Animal names confer both anonymity and power as players create their new online 
personas. It is from Extinctathon that Crake gains the appellation he will retain for the rest of his 
life, after the “Red-necked Crake,” an extinct Australian bird (81). His original name, Glenn, is 
no competition for the identity of Crake, and Snowman “has trouble thinking of Crake as Glenn, 
                                                 
9 “It is safe to say,” according to Wilson, “that at least a fifth of the species of  plants and animals [will] be gone or 
committed to early extinction by 2030, and half by the end of the century” (The Future of Life 102).  
 25
 
so thoroughly . . . has the later persona blotted out his earlier one” (70). Not so for the name 
Crake selects for Jimmy, “Thickney,” taken from “a defunct Australian double-jointed bird that 
used to hang around in cemeteries” (81). While, as J. Brooks Bouson notes, Thickney becomes 
appropriate after the world turns into the post-JUVE “graveyard” (144), Jimmy prefers to 
select his own name: 
‘My name is Snowman,’ said Jimmy, who had thought this over. He no longer 
wanted to be Jimmy, or even Jim, and especially not Thickney: his incarnation as 
Thickney hadn’t worked out well. He needed to forget the past—the distant past, 
the immediate past, the past in any form. He needed to exist only in the present, 
without guilt, without expectation . . . Perhaps a different name would do that for 
him. (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 348-49)   
As the Abominable Snowman, Jimmy appropriates the label of a mythological creature, breaking 
the naming rules Crake establishes of demonstrable “physical equivalent[s]” (7). The 
Abominable Snowman—Jimmy’s minor act of rebellion against the memory of Crake—contains 
a measure of safety: it can never become extinct, because it never was real to begin with. 
Crake is very skilled at playing Extinctathon, accumulating enough points for Grandmaster 
status. Like the early naturalists who sought to preserve knowledge of species by collecting their 
dead furred, scaled, and feathered bodies, Crake collects the names of extinct species at the same 
time he plots to save nature by eliminating humanity. Jimmy finds much later that Crake never 
ceased involvement with the game, and in fact garnered his own cadre of MaddAddam 
bioengineers to help develop both the Crakers and the JUVE virus; the creation of both could 
simply be seen as Crake’s winning move in the final round of Extinctathon. Through the games 
and Jimmy and Crake’s involvement, Atwood joins cultural extinction to biotic extinction, and, 
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through Crake’s Grandmaster status, to human species extinction; all fall along a continuum of 
human involvement.  
Jimmy’s exposure to the world is informed by his online education, and despite the quantities of 
data available to him, his remains a parochial, nature-free existence. Not really comprehending 
(unlike Crake) the scale of destruction happening outside human terms, Jimmy’s experience with 
extinction is bound to the personal. He does not reflect on the demise of organisms not intimately 
related to his circle of existence: they are abstractions, tokens in a game. For Jimmy/Snowman, 
extinction is revealed in a pile of burning cows; it is manifested through the slow, tortuous fading 
of the maternal presence; it is bright, sharp loss when Killer disappears; it is dematerializing human 
culture and language; and it is the deaths of Crake and Oryx—the two humans he mourns out of all 
the multitude, and the two who, as mythic elements, come to symbolize a vanished species.  
Thus, the extinction narrative revealed through Jimmy/Snowman’s experience brings us to the 
precipice of humanism’s dissolution. In the next chapter I will look closer at the disappearance of 
the humanist subject and the arrival of his replacement, the posthuman “Children of Crake” (9). 
Inheritors of a much different world, the Crakers embody a derivative humanity, an alien 






CHAPTER TWO: THE POSTHUMAN MICROSCOPE 
The Extinction of Humanism 
By definition, humanism places humans at the center of meaning. As a cautionary tale, Oryx and 
Crake deconstructs this meaning by demonstrating the consequences of a monocular concept of 
existence; this tunnel vision willfully ignores the natural interconnections of all life. Snowman’s 
memories preserve humanity’s path to extinction, but they also record the devolution of 
technology’s promise. Technology, humanism’s darling, provides material proof that reason 
separates us from the beasts. In manifesting scientific knowledge, technology serves the noble 
purpose of improving living conditions by preventing hunger, enhancing medical care, and 
connecting communities, but technology also has a dark side, enabling human consumption to 
pursue an ever-increasing destructive arc.  
While Jimmy provides the historical and cultural facet to the humanist subject, Crake provides 
the other side: secular, self-sufficient, empirical, and logical. Crake scoffs at humanist cultural 
vestiges, not understanding the humanist influences on the scientific methodology practiced in 
the university labs and on the individuated lives he and his “con-specifics” lead (Atwood, Oryx 
and Crake 209). Even in his desire to create a genetically improved human, Crake bows to the 
idea that humanity must continue. We have already encountered Jimmy’s faltering paradigm in 
the shrinking influence of cultural endeavors and aesthetic language, recessions that reflect the 
vaunted importance of science and reason. But Crake’s world is devolving as well, as science 
and technology serve only capitalistic interests with a blind eye to the organic system failure 
happening on a planet-wide scale.  
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Whereas Jimmy exhibits only peripheral attention to the decaying humanist artifice prior to the 
apocalypse, Crake shares active awareness with MaddAddam, the Extinctathon group, that 
continually-improving biotechnology cannot salvage a mutilated biosphere. As he tells Jimmy, 
humans are running out of time: “Demand for resources has exceeded supply for decades in 
marginal geopolitical areas, hence the famines and droughts; but very soon, demand is going to 
exceed supply for everyone” (295). Inequities abound, with the privileged few—the “graft-ridden 
prince[s]” living as royalty in the Compounds —consuming more than their fair share of energy 
and goods with small regard for the deteriorating environment (245), while the poor masses of 
third-world countries place burdens on shrinking resources through ever-growing populations. 
Impoverished farmers in countries impacted by global warming sell their children in order to 
survive (116), and  even in America those outside the Compounds struggle for survival, with 
“squatters” living in “sheds and huts put together from scavenged materials—sheets of tin, slabs 
of plywood” (183).  
New biotechnologies are driven by commercial applications, with minimal concern over 
deleterious side effects to either human or animal populations. Atwood’s text is littered with 
cases of unintended consequences and the chain-reaction of errors compounding errors. One 
example, the “gen-mod coffee wars,” presents a foreseeable outcome for an improved coffee 
bean that replaces human labor with mechanized farming. What is beneficial for the developed 
world—“a cheaper cup of coffee”—dislocates laborers and small growers alike, and triggers 
insurrection (178-80). Another illustration is the gene-spliced bobkitten, which when multiplied 
becomes a much larger, more dangerous problem than the “big green rabbits” it is supposed to 
control (163-64). Solutions like the “Happicuppa bean, developed by a HelthWyzer subsidiary” 
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(178), and the disease-carrying HelthWyzer vitamin pills (211) are symptoms of science 
captivated by the bottom line and perverted by profit.  
Extinction for the analytical aspect of humanism is not as blatant as the cultural extirpation, but it 
is happening nonetheless. Despite technological advances and increased understanding of the 
chemical building blocks of life, science has not produced an integrated, harmonious means of 
planetary survival, and the ideal of the human subject able to muscle through any situation with 
mental agility and willpower has delivered humanity to a cul-de-sac: global warming is the 
reality swamping New York City (former site of much cultural enterprise and one-time financial 
center of the world) while searing the food producing regions of the world. The empirical vision 
still works toward controlling nature and concentrating material well-being for a few elites, but 
the illusory nature of that control is surfacing. The struggle of maintaining the chimera of an 
open cornucopia of good health, bountiful food, and creature comfort is increasingly difficult, 
and reveals itself in artifice and prosthesis: “soy-sausage dogs and coconut-style layer cake” 
(72), “SoyOBoyburgers” (74), “ChickieNobs Bucket O’Nubbins” (242), and the pharmaceutical 
organ-bank pigoons.  
Human progress thus follows a logical, cynical trend channeling all scientific and technological 
developments into capitalist profit centers. The knowledge and craft that separate us from other 
animals does not make us more humane, and the numeric success of the human species does not 
necessarily reveal wisdom. Instead, what scientific knowledge and technology signify in this 
context is the blindness of an anthropocentric, empirical worldview that offers no hope of 
awakening. Neither artistic idealism nor scientific regimen can undo the climatic damage caused 
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by several centuries of industrial production, and the deadly fate of humanity in Oryx and Crake 
illustrates that human survival ultimately depends on adaptation to, rather than colonization of, 
the biosphere. 
Mechanical Constructs and Composite Organisms 
The posthuman emerges from the rifts that also give birth to post-structuralism, post-modernism, 
post-colonialism, and gender studies: the works of Charles Darwin, Karl Marx, and Sigmund 
Freud.10 These worldviews all challenge the centrality of the human subject, calling into question 
divine preference, social assumptions, and unadulterated cognizance. In particular, these shifts in 
understanding highlight the positioning of the white male subject of European stock, the 
foundation of the humanist subject. Once these presumptions have been aired the possibility of 
reconstruction is opened, bringing with it the posthuman. But the posthuman also carries traces 
of humanism in its DNA: the language theorizing and describing this new construction is built 
with the architecture of humanist thought. The armature guiding construction of the posthuman is 
itself recursive of humanist processes and values.11 While Hayles questions “will the 
transformation into the posthuman annihilate the subject?” (281), she also recognizes that “many 
attributes of the liberal humanist subject, especially the attribute of agency, continue to be valued 
in the face of the posthuman” (279).  
Even as the informatics view of posthumanism visualizes disembodiment—downloading the 
mind into a computer—as the ultimate evolution, we must remember it is still contextualized as a 
                                                 
10 Badmington 4-7; Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto” 71. 
11 In discussing the relationship between posthumanism and deconstruction, Neil Badmington argues “humanism 
never manages to constitute itself; it forever rewrites itself as posthumanism” (9). 
 31
 
human mind. As Eugene Thacker recognizes, this form of posthumanism “consciously models 
itself as a type of humanism,” retaining “certain unique qualities of the human—self-awareness, 
consciousness and reflection, self-direction and development, the capacity for scientific and 
technological progress, and the valuation of rational thought” (75). The difficulty of escaping the 
humanist trajectory precludes finality in constructing the posthuman: posthumanism must always 
question its own genesis, purpose, and reality.  
The Cartesian concept of the mind/body split aligns with the posthuman viewpoint of “the 
body as the original prosthesis,” simply a tool to be controlled by the mind (Hayles 3). From 
this vantage point, information is prioritized, and the human brain is perceived to operate like a 
computer, “independent of any material realization or embedding in a social context or 
anything having to do with emotion or development” (de Waal and Thompson 46). 
Nonetheless, the human brain is not isolated from the body, and in fact relies extensively on 
physical sensory receivers (skin, eyes, ears, and nose) to provide informational feedback in 
dealing with the external environment. The mind—that which we recognize as resulting from 
the processes of the brain—is, according to E.O. Wilson, “the coded representation of sensory 
impressions and the memory and imagination of sensory impressions” (Consilience 109). 
Furthermore, research reveals that chemical triggers enable this coded perception, and that 
hormones and enzymes play critical roles in how our bodies and brains process sensory input. 
The brain is dependant on the body for acquiring nutrients which make possible synaptic 
processes; elements such as calcium, potassium, copper, and iodine enable the chemical 
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transactions producing thought (Gómez-Pinilla 569-71). In this respect, humans are tethered to 
the physical, organic sphere and an animal ancestry.12
People are not born human, but become human as part of learning, enculturation, and mimicry, 
and exist as humans relative to other humans in social units. As Evan Thompson relates, 
“cognitive science has had to rediscover things like empathy and enculturation . . . it’s not going 
to be possible to understand human mental life without connecting it to sociality and emotion 
and embodiment” (de Waal and Thompson 46). Our emotional, language, and cognitive faculties 
have to recapitulate evolution in each new generation.13 Technophiles imparting primacy to the 
information-processing part of human intelligence argue that sensory inputs can be replaced with 
mechanical constructs, but this scenario assumes an ability to replicate natural structures while 
maintaining fidelity to existing biological capabilities. The result may be a pixilated, digitally 
enhanced reality; we have no way of knowing whether the sensory input from these kinds of 
engineered solutions will engender the same organic learning responses humans currently enjoy. 
“For information to exist,” Hayles affirms, “it must always be instantiated in a medium” (13), 
and in humans these modes of information and data transfer reside within a physical body. She 
goes on to confirm that “Embodiment can be destroyed, but it cannot be replicated,” denying the 
informatics ideal of disembodied human intelligence. If you remove the physical instantiation—
the human body—then the mind has nothing to retrieve, process, and share. We exist, mind and 
                                                 
12 Fernando Gómez-Pinilla cites research substantiating “the ability of food-derived signals to influence energy 
metabolism and synaptic plasticity and, thus, mediate the effects of food on cognitive functions” in his argument 
linking diet to human evolution (569).  
13 Wilson argues emotion is integral to rational thought, noting that “without the stimulus and guidance of emotion, 
rational thought slows and disintegrates. The rational mind does not float above the irrational; it cannot free itself to 
engage in pure reason” (Consilience 113). 
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body, in the corporeal realm, and the finality of extinction, whether it involves “the planet” or 
“an individual life-form,” is beyond the reach of human control (49). 
To Jimmy, the pre-JUVE world elicits a mind-body split, but it is the body, not the brain, that has 
control. For Jimmy (and many others, from his memories of online representations of 
grotesqueries, bodily vanities, and pleasure of the flesh) the body, that which humanism 
considered a “corrupt vessel or else a puppet” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 85), dominates all 
actions. Addicted to alcohol, cigarettes, drugs, and sex, Jimmy is in thrall to his body regardless 
of the arguments his mind erects; his experience is a microcosm of prevailing human frailties. 
Crake is condescending of such bodily domination, expressing his disdain both verbally, 
referring to dating as “Pair-bonding” and “unproductive random scanning” (207), and through 
his extinction-provoking (hemorrhagic virus) and life-form generating (Crakers) actions. Yet 
even Crake finds himself subject to bodily drives and human emotions in his relationship with 
Oryx; even those with the genius gene are not immune to the body’s hormone dance. Jimmy 
observes “Crake had never been a toucher, he’d been physically remote, but now he likes to have 
a hand on Oryx: on her shoulder, her arm, her small waist, her perfect butt” (313). He is finally 
(humanly) susceptible to the bodily imperatives manifested as “love” (309). 
Accepting the inescapability and necessity of embodiment unites humans as organisms with the 
pre- and nonhuman, for the processes of the body on a cellular level have linkages with all 
Earth’s other biota. Travel back far enough in time, and humans and others emerge from the 
same single-celled organism. Embodiment and feedback systems are an indication that humans 
share the foundations of their information gathering systems with other earthly organisms. 
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Genetic studies have peeled back some of the mysteries associated with biological functions, and 
at the same time revealed a genetic background for humanity that shares commonality with all 
other organisms.14 Gaining a deeper understanding of the biology behind human origins also 
assists comprehension of human relatedness to other organisms. What makes us human is also, in 
some cases, what makes the chimpanzee a chimp, makes the dog a dog, or what makes the 
flatworm a flatworm. The relatedness in underlying genetic information is the key to the trans-
specific modifications taking place in Oryx and Crake’s Compounds. 
Science fiction literature has long challenged the notion of the primacy of human physicality. 
Various themes implicate either the human mind or body (or both) as limiting in nature, 
embellishing evolved abilities with mental or physical improvements. Ideas such as telepathy, 
teleportation, and telekinesis illustrate the limitations of existing human brain power, while 
cyborg or genetic augmentation demonstrates the deficiencies in a natural, non-altered physical 
condition. And these are just the human allegories: aliens, robots, and genetically modified 
companion species are other examples the genre uses to point out the finite capacity of human 
existence. In Clifford D. Simak’s novel City, for example, humans abandon the earth, migrating 
to Jupiter to experience a superior existence as Jovian lopers: “he had found something greater 
than Man had ever known. A swifter, surer body. A sense of exhilaration, a deeper sense of life. 
A sharper mind.” An alien body and alien mentality is naturally superior to the human, 
intimating that “the brains of Earth things” are inherently “slow and foggy” (84).  
                                                 
14 Lynn Margulis attests to the undergirding relationships of all life, noting that “long-chain molecules such as 
DNA, ribonucleic acid (RNA), and protein permit us to study all life with a single standard of measure” (56). 
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Greg Bear’s Blood Music offers another transcendent form of transformative embodiment, with 
human cognition absorbed into an inhuman microscopic universe. Corporeal existence is 
replaced with an all-mind consciousness; the body is no longer necessary, along with the earth 
and all material existence: “Thought rises above the chemistry, the interchanges within his 
cluster and the processes within his cells. Thought is the combination, the language of all 
interaction” (189). As in these other examples, humans are deemed lacking in Oryx and Crake; 
Crake’s perception that humans are physically maladapted to the changing environment, plus his 
misanthropic judgment of human emotional and psychological behavior underlie the 
development of his “children” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 96). Possessing perfect, aesthetically 
pleasing bodies, and devoid of the human characteristics he thought nonessential, the Crakers are 
Crake’s gene-spliced response to humanity’s shortcomings (302).  
Crakers: Genomic Posthuman Bodies 
In contrast to the primacy of mind and data celebrated by informatics, Haraway points out that 
“bodies are maps of power and identity” (“A Cyborg” 83); the posthuman can embrace 
corporeality and celebrate the communications buried in chemical, bodily code. This is the vision 
of the posthuman manifested in the Crakers. While not cybernetic organisms, the Crakers still 
represent a product of both digital and organic information revolutions. They would not be possible 
without the human genome project: the knowledge for restructuring their genetic makeup is 
enabled by computational tools and the structures they reveal, and their creation is the cumulative 
result of the knowledge gained “Once the proteonome had been fully analyzed” (Atwood, Oryx 
and Crake 302). Computers provide information processing speed and are necessary for reaching 
this level of understanding and calculating the masses of data contained within the genetic code. 
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Without the assistance of digital technology, genetic engineering at the level of Crake’s team of 
Grandmasters would be impossible, and the scientists would not be able to modify, grow, and 
educate the Crakers within one lifetime. While technocrats describe “Superhumanity,” “progress,” 
and “immortality” as posthuman attributes (Vinge 19), Crake’s children follow a different 
posthuman path. As Ku points out, the Crakers’ hybridity confers “dominance over humans by dint 
of their greater survivability” (115). They are programmed with “rapid-growth factors” and a 
lifespan of thirty years, eliminating old age and infirmity, and by editing out the “foreknowledge . . 
. and the fear” of death, Crake devises his own version of immortality (303).15 They have also been 
engineered to preclude material progress—an emphatically non-technocratic feature. 
Although the Crakers retain an outward appearance of humanity, they are not totally human in 
body or mind. Like the organisms in Blood Music, the Crakers are biologically altered rather than 
technologically augmented. Bouson describes the Crakers as part of an “extended MaddAddam 
joke” Atwood uses to signal the farce as well as the danger of “a bioengineered posthuman future” 
(149), but the altered hominids are not humorous in themselves: any humor resides in the warped 
reflection of humanity we see in them. Their strangeness arises from the animality they have 
inherited from gene-splice technology, differences vested in the serious business of survival. Crake 
takes most of his “invention” from adaptations already present in nature, understandings he gained 
from exposure to Extinctathon. “Think of an adaptation, any adaptation,” he tells Jimmy, “and 
some animal somewhere will have thought of it first” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 164). Crake is led 
into awareness through the information accessed online during the “definitive” period of his and 
                                                 
15 At one year of age, a Craker “looks like a five-year-old,” and by four he or she will “be an adolescent.” Crake’s 
rationale is that “too much time is wasted in child-rearing . . . and being a child” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 158).  
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Jimmy’s adolescence (300); while Jimmy is falling in love with Shakespeare, Crake is learning 
about biodiversity loss with the Grandmasters, and assimilating the diversity which will later 
manifest in the Crakers.  
Adaptation itself is a feedback system, with improved survivability traits transferring to the next 
generation. Feedback from one generation to the next provides information traveling 
diachronically as well as from one information structure to another. Crake simply applies and 
speeds up evolutionary fixes to enable more robust survival traits for the new climate the old 
humanity has engendered, and to rid the species of effects he views as unnecessary or dangerous. 
These include two attributes that define Jimmy’s life, but which Crake views as superfluous: a 
sense of humor and sexual love (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 305-306). Physical changes include 
modified digestive tracts which allow them to eat leaves, grass and caecotrophs (158-59), an 
adaptation precluding hunger and thus eliminating the need for agriculture (Atwood, Oryx and 
Crake Revealed).16 With thickened skin resistant to ultraviolet damage, they do not need textiles 
(Atwood, Oryx and Crake 6), and they have an “extra layer of skin on the bottoms of their feet,” 
voiding the need for shoes (Atwood, Oryx and Crake Revealed). Since they are passive creatures, 
the males use scent-marking with their genetically-modified urine to define their territory and keep 
predators out (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 154-55). The Crakers’ sex drives are modified to eliminate 
continual estrus, with cyclical reproduction taking place every third year. The mating rituals are 
tightly structured; Crake’s rationale is to prevent pair bonding, doing away with jealousy, rivalry, 
and sexual aggression (164-65). They do not “register skin color,” eradicating in-group/out-group 
                                                 
16 Caecotrophs, a modification Crake bases on “hares and rabbits,” consists of “semi-digested herbage, discharged 
through the anus and reswallowed two or three times a week” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 158-59). 
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conflicts. By editing “nothing less than the ancient primate brain,” Crake aims to reconfigure 
human culture. In changing the Crakers’ genetic makeup, “hierarchy,” “territoriality,” “racism,” 
and sexual possessiveness are all theoretically rendered obsolete (305).  
Genetically constituted of many creatures united within the human form, the Crakers thus offer 
metaphoric unity: the symbiotic relationship available to humans in the schema of life on earth is 
expressed in miniature within each Craker body. Humanity does not take up the challenge of 
recognizing its interdependence with earth’s other biota, so Crake’s humanoid constructs must 
represent the synthesis. Human singularity, the complement to humanist individualism, is a 
primary fact in most human philosophy and religion.17 But as Lynn Margulis reminds us, the 
human “sense of species superiority”—the denial that we are not already part of the “Symbiotic 
interaction [which] is the stuff of life on a crowded planet”—is a “delusion of grandeur” (98). 
The bodies of the Crakers are merely fictional representatives of an always-already physical 
reality: humans are already symbiotes dependent on multiple other specifics. The merging of life, 
the transversing of species boundaries is part of our cellular history; Crake and his fellow 
scientists only exaggerate and accelerate the process. 
The God Complex and “Paradice” 
Crake’s posthuman genetic experiment is carried out under the “Paradice” dome in the 
RejoovenEsence Compound: “It had its own park around it, a dense climate-controlling 
plantation of mixed tropical splices above which it rose like a blind eyeball” (Atwood, Oryx and 
Crake 297). Blindness can insinuate the inability of the CorpSeCorp and the Compound 
                                                 
17 Haraway describes this singularity as “abstract individuation, an ultimate self untied at last from all dependency, a 
man in space” (“A Cyborg” 71). 
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authorities in discerning what is really going on, as it can explain Jimmy’s state of mind. Crake’s 
encapsulated paradise is the new Eden, and his experimental humans are replacements for the 
worn-out race of Adam and Eve. Crake’s posthumans are not cyborgs; they do not mechanically 
self-replicate, nor are they “uncoupled from organic reproduction” (Haraway, “A Cyborg” 70). 
His goal is not engineering cyborgs; his ultimate aim is preservation of the biosphere by erasing 
human civilization. As he explains to Jimmy, it only requires “the elimination of one generation” 
to stop progress forever: “all the available surface metals have already been mined . . . Without 
which, no iron age, no bronze age, no age of steel.” In the struggle for survival, knowledge 
would be lost and technology that is “too complex now” would disappear, never to be replaced 
(Atwood, Oryx and Crake 223). Only natural forms adapted to the environment would be able to 
thrive. Crake, the mad scientist, is playing God, making the judgment of whether the rest of 
humanity should live.  
Crake’s disgust with humanity is mirrored in the actions of MaddAddam, God’s Gardeners, and 
Amanda Payne’s two artist roommates, who explain to Jimmy the significance of the agricultural 
revolution: “once agriculture was invented . . . the human experiment was doomed, first to 
gigantism due to a maxed-out food supply, and then to extinction, once all the available nutrients 
had been hoovered up” (242-43).18 As Crake notes, “Homo sapiens” is not self-regulating like 
other organisms; it is “one of the few species that doesn’t limit reproduction in the face of 
dwindling resources” (120).   
                                                 




Eliminating much of what humanist principles exalt as the human condition, Crake’s “children” 
exemplify physical survival, not creative intellect. The Crakers have language, but Crake 
attempts to engineer the elements a humanist would recognize: intelligence, creativity, invention, 
and exploration—the “curious monkey brain”—out of the genome (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 
222). The main information transfer that takes place for a Craker is on a cellular level, 
communicating the animal/human gene sequences from one generation to the next. Like 
Haraway’s cyborgs, the Crakers are “a kind of disassembled and reassembled, post-modern 
collective and personal self” (“A Cyborg” 79). 
Nevertheless, while the first-generation Crakers may be a product of digital informatics, their 
children are purely biological posthumans, and they show evidence of the survival of at least one 
trait by exhibiting curiosity in the post-JUVE world: the children pelt Snowman with questions 
about artifacts and his appearance (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 7-8). Further signs that Crake has 
not been totally successful in erasing the vestiges of humanity are apparent in a “develop[ing] 
reverence” toward the mythic figures of Oryx and Crake: “They must perform some kind of 
prayer or invocation . . . they’re conversing with the invisible” (157). They are also falling into a 
loose hierarchy, with some individuals assuming spokesperson roles. It is too early to tell if 
Crake’s fears of reformation are grounded, with tyrants and war naturally following “leaders and 
the led” (155). Atwood seems to hint that some parts of the human psyche are embedded too 
deeply in the genome to be easily rent: “We’re hard-wired for dreams . . . we’re hard-wired for 
singing. Singing and dreams were entwined” (352).  
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Crake’s attempts to distance his posthuman creations from human culture are made from a 
position anchored in that very culture. The technologies that enable Compound research have 
their roots in empirical scientific traditions, and as such celebrate the intellect and rationality of 
Homo sapiens. The genetic manipulation taking place in the Compounds is justifiable on the 
grounds of improving human health and producing commodifiable goods, but the rationale does 
not extend to foretelling unintended consequences or predictable negatives. The control of 
nature—the paradigm residing at the center of human progress—is enacted on an expectation of 
immediate advantage. Short-term planning only takes into consideration available resources, and 
as long as those resources (such as ocean stocks) can be harvested, human nature is not 
motivated to change. The crumbling infrastructure of natural systems accompanying global 
warming only signals a need for new sources of food, not an amendment of current activities. 
This aspect of humanism highlights the utilitarian value attached to nature: the world, as such, 
exists solely for human consumption.  
Glover identifies the tendency toward the “objectification of nature” in Oryx and Crake as 
pursuing an instrumentalist paradigm (52). Western philosophy’s embrace of this perspective has 
been described by Carolyn Merchant as the “mechanistic” view, a way of thinking about nature 
that escalated with the birth of the Scientific Revolution. Prior to that period, humans had 
enjoyed an “organic” understanding of the earth’s processes, but “new images of mastery and 
domination” in the seventeenth century “functioned as cultural sanctions for the denudation of 
nature” (2). Although nature has been viewed as a wilderness throughout western history (as 
evident in biblical accounts), the technological advances of Enlightenment Europe and America 
provided new ways of subduing the natural wild. Not only has the Judeo-Christian God 
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“authorized human dominion over the earth” (Merchant 131), but human genius has increasingly 
made possible radical domination, such as aggressive mining practices, market-based farming 
technologies, and marsh and swampland reclamation (36-37, 51, 61). By manipulating natural 
organisms and toying with genetic realities, the scientists and technicians of Oryx and Crake are 
just following a pattern historically recognized as the human-centered, instrumental approach.  
In addition to the surface purposes of increasing food sources, the pharmaceutical companies that 
run the largest Compounds are responsible for creating “New and different” diseases designed to 
keep money flowing “From patients to doctors, from clients to cure-peddlers” (Atwood, Oryx 
and Crake 210-11). The new economy depends on disease, as a disease-free population would 
not be profitable. As Crake explains, “‘The best diseases, from a business point of view . . . 
would be those that cause lingering illnesses. Ideally—that is, for maximum profit—the patient 
should either get well or die just before all his or her money runs out. It’s a fine calculation’” 
(211). The mind—the coin of the realm in the Compounds—proves to be as corrupt as the flesh. 
As the scientists pursue immoral science in search of profit, the seeds for human extinction are 
already in place, managed for power and control the way other doomsday weapons (such as 
nuclear missiles) have always been managed. Crake’s elegant solution completes the extinction 
of humanism, along with humanity, but it is a solution grounded as much in blind reaction as 
prior efforts to control nature. His evolving outlook can be determined from the changing 
refrigerator magnets in his apartment, from “The proper study of Mankind is Everything” (207), 
to “Where God is, Man is not” (301). His either-or approach opens the gate for a new kind of 
human, while negating any chance for concert between the old humanity and nature.  
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Between the empirical domain of the Compounds and the posthuman world of the Crakers lies 
the landscape of Oryx and Crake‘s women actors. I will next explore the contrasting shadows of 
the humanist subject in the survival experience of Oryx, as well as the standpoint of struggle 
embodied by Sharon. Sharon and Oryx are separated by culture, education, race, and experience, 
but their individual existences are impacted by the same humanistic constructs that exert 
nomenclative control over nature, and their fates are intimately tied to corporate power, 













CHAPTER THREE: RESISTING WOMEN 
Gendered Vision 
In Oryx and Crake, both animals and humans are subject to extinction, categorization, and 
genetic reconstruction. Atwood’s attention to words and naming conventions accentuates the role 
language plays in constructing the reality of her near-future dystopia; from the title characters 
(named after extinct animals) to the protagonist’s pet (the gentle hybrid named “Killer”), 
nomenclative structures facilitate an understanding of the role masculine narratives play in 
science and technology, and by extension, the natural world. For example, Extinctathon 
proclaims “Adam named the living animals, MaddAddam names the dead ones,” a reference to 
Adamic naming linked to Classical and Enlightenment trends of categorizing living and dead 
humans as well as animals (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 80). Atwood’s use of language works to 
demystify science as a cultural construct.  
In response to Martin Halliwell’s comment in an interview on the scarcity of female characters in 
Oryx and Crake; Atwood asserts that there are “female people,” but they are filtered through the 
lens of Jimmy/Snowman’s perceptions. Sharon, Oryx, and his multiple girlfriends all add to the 
feminine contingent of the narrative, and all are colored by Jimmy’s reality. The resultant two-
dimensional portraiture illustrates Atwood’s comment that not many men are “fully conversant 
with the inner lives of women who are the objects of their affections” (qtd. in Halliwell 255). 
Gendered constructions are part of a worldview founded on cultural edifices so finely layered and 
stitched into our awareness that they fade into a natural, true, seamless understanding; the words 
we use to express these “truths” are complicit both in constructing and maintaining the worldview. 
On one level, Atwood’s presentation acknowledges the culturally constructed relationships 
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between men and women, but it also provokes consideration that constructed reality extends 
beyond associations with the opposite sex, and that language supports this reality. Only the 
massive humanity-destroying extinction event in Oryx and Crake throws the entire fabrication into 
relief, painfully prodding Snowman’s assumptions as he re-views significant events from his life. 
At the narrative’s opening, Snowman’s attire consists of a tattered bed-sheet, a baseball cap, and 
a shattered pair of sunglasses; the single lens of his broken glasses warns us that his vision and 
memory are fragmented and tainted by imperfect understanding, while his sheet speaks of 
sleeping consciousness (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 4). At the same time, half-sight can also allude 
to emergent vision as Snowman begins to recognize the signs that were always present but 
hidden from his pre-extinction viewpoint. With his flawed yet awakening sight, Snowman is the 
sieve through which Atwood pours the narrative body of Oryx and Crake; as the word person, 
Snowman echoes the language that shapes events. Sharon and Oryx appear, reappear, and 
disappear within Snowman’s account, in the process revealing the humanist-empiricist roots 
implicit in gendered assumptions. 
Feminist readings of Oryx and Crake produce multiple perspectives. DiMarco observes that 
Crake, metaphoric father to both the Crakers and the JUVE epidemic, assumes the role of “homo 
faber” (171). His utilization of Oryx to first educate the Crakers, then spread the virus makes her 
his tool for this instrumentalist vision, “akin to nature as the material or body that must be 
manipulated in order for homo faber’s production to occur” (184). DiMarco notes that, in this 
same instrumentalist paradigm of the Compounds, Sharon “self-selects herself out of doing 
research,” making her “of no ‘use’” to the amoral activities taking place there (189). Fiona Tolan 
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recognizes Sharon’s ethical qualms over the genetic manipulation taking place in the Compounds 
as indicative of “feminist standpoint epistemology”: the questions and challenges Sharon raises 
illuminate the “history of natural science that has always held peculiar dangers for women” (278-
79). Oryx, meanwhile, manifests multiple roles, “incessantly self-inventing” in the context of her 
sex work, as the Crakers' teacher, as a business woman, and as a goddess. Oryx’s multiplicity of 
identities “seems to point to a postfeminist agency,” while her reincorporation by Snowman as 
the Crakers’ nature goddess is symptomatic of “ecofeminism and spiritual feminism” (Tolan 
290-91). In this section I will explore the contrasting shadows of feminism and humanism from 
the standpoint of women in science, embodied by Sharon, and the survival experience, 
engendered by Oryx. Through this analysis I will show how the language and technology of 
western institutions shapes the fate of each.   
What’s In A Name 
Many labels shape Sharon’s identity: wife, Jimmy’s mother, microbiologist, former OrganInc 
employee, runaway, radical protestor, and martyr. As wife and mother, she does not live up to 
traditional social expectations, and her career is stymied by her emerging questions concerning 
Compound ethics. The text reveals Sharon’s agency as illusion masquerading as empowerment: 
she is free to be anything she wants, as long as she wants to be wife, mother, and loyal employee. 
In her failure as a mother, she represents resistance to the essential nature of woman as a 
maternal figure, and she is proof that mothering is not an innate capacity of the human female. 
Distracted by inner moral turmoil and external situations, she is incapable of performing even 
basic primary duties for her family, duties represented culturally as women’s work. In 
Snowman’s memories, she is “a clear image, full color,” implying accurate sight (49), but the 
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image is often of a remote woman in a magenta robe, holding onto a cigarette (31). This is a 
picture projected by a needy child’s emotions, and not a vision of the complete human being, 
Sharon. Young Jimmy usually has to fend for himself in making his own lunch, but the times his 
mother has “a real lunch waiting for him,” he is frightened by her feigned maternal act: 
“carefully dressed, her lipstick smile an echo of the jelly smile on the sandwich . . . her eyes 
bluer than blue” (31-32). In attempting to adopt the expected behavior of a mother, she reveals 
the growing strain of an unnatural (for her) position, and her failure expands to absent-minded 
neglect topped off with “her increasingly weird smile” (50).    
Sharon resists the essentialism of motherhood, and she also refuses the seductive and rewarding 
masculinized science construct. Unlike Jimmy/Snowman’s fractured sight, Sharon’s eyes elicit 
clarity, seeing through the naturalized paradigm. Paternalism runs deep in the Compounds; with 
private educational and medical institutions, shopping malls, and piped-in entertainment via the 
internet, the Compounds foster a dependency in the employees that few acknowledge or resist. 
The emphasis on external danger is further psychological encouragement to remain isolated, and 
if all of those incentives fail, then the exit/entry process is invasive and cumbersome enough to 
dissuade travel. Rather than freedom and opportunity, the Compounds offer a gated existence 
monitored and sustained by an omnipresent employer. Glover points to the “prison” of 
Compound life for Sharon, a prison she must escape once “she voices her horror at the 
instrumentalism practised within compound walls” (54). Sharon recognizes the danger inherent 
in paternalistic provision, and the false security represented by Compound protection; she is the 
voice for the ideologically pure science objectives which Compound employees relinquish for 
the trappings of material prosperity. Through Sharon’s vision we understand the fabrication of 
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Compound existence (27, 227). Through her resistance, we recognize the life and death power 
associated with Compound science and technology. 
Language is revealed as a necessary tool in establishing hierarchy in the pre-apocalypse communities 
of Oryx and Crake. Within the Compounds, scientific knowledge is the regimenting factor, an 
outcome of which can be seen in the prestige of the different schools. Proficiency in math and 
science, such as Crake’s skill-set, ensures an education at a premium school like Watson-Crick, while 
non-proficiency means a degree from a valueless school like Martha Graham.19 Key to these 
transitions is the language of science, terminology coded in the Latinate nomenclature of biology and 
the mathematical ciphers of chemistry. This language has deep roots in western culture, roots that 
prove to be neither benign nor neutral in terms of gender, class, and race. The techno-science driving 
commerce and culture in Oryx and Crake owes its genesis to the methodology and authenticity 
established during the Enlightenment. Biblical claims provide the Adamic right to bestow names, but 
the formalized process of identifying and categorizing the natural world is the philosophical legacy of 
classical Greece, honed and refined during the Scientific Revolution. Naming and categorizing work 
together to shape the empirical worldview, defining not just the object observed, but the process of 
observing and the role of the observer.   
                                                 
19 While Oryx and Crake‘s Watson-Crick Institute represents masculine scientific priority, the narrative of the actual 
search for the structure of DNA reveals a system privileging male prerogatives. According to Lynne Osman Elkin, 
the effort which garnered James Watson and Francis Crick the Nobel Prize in genetics relied significantly upon the 
unrewarded contributions of the chemist Rosalind Franklin. It was Franklin’s unpublished x-ray photograph #51 
which inspired Watson’s revelation as to the helical structure of the molecule, although she is not cited as a source in 
Watson, Crick, and Wilkins’ Nobel lectures.      
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Women, Science, and Nature 
Valence for the scientific method is predicated upon the assumption of objectivity, with credibility 
sustained by non-questioning acceptance. Science thus construed exists outside social constructs; 
its goal is simply the search for pure knowledge for the betterment of humanity. But this purity is 
suspect in the very unquestioning acceptance it mandates, and in the proposition of the external, 
non-discriminating viewer. As Emma Whelan observes, “The scientific method and scientific 
rationality are called into question as positing an untenable view from nowhere; knowledge, the 
knowing subject, and scientific and technological practices and products are themselves products 
of their social, material, and discursive contexts” (544). When we question the empiricist 
paradigm, we immediately perceive gendered dualisms infecting scientific processes, including 
nature/feminine and nature/culture couplings; we also detect a gendered active/passive construct. 
Traditional perceptions separate the masculine and feminine spheres into external (active) and 
domestic (passive) areas. Because women are excluded in its Classical and Enlightenment 
incarnations, science and the accompanying technology are naturalized as masculine domains. 
“Science,” Londa Schiebinger argues, “is not value neutral but emerges from complex cultural 
matrices”; like other institutions, science is a product of the people involved, physical location, and 
era of production (74). And as science and technology are reflective of society and culture, they are 
also “constitutive of cultural and social conditions” that can be appreciated as “reality-producing 
and –reproducing practices” (Moser 6). The science in Oryx and Crake may take place in the mid-
twenty-first century and reflect and generate the social and economic expectations of that imagined 
time period, but it also contains traces of earlier historical practices in its structure and language. 
 50
 
To illustrate the non-innocent historical masculinization of scientific research, Donna Haraway 
cites the Enlightenment-era example of Robert Boyle, “the father of chemistry” and “the 
experimental way of life.” Common acceptance of unbiased scientific reporting depends on an 
assumption of “public and collective” trial and proof, but the heritage of this kind of witnessing (as 
seen in Boyle’s air-pump demonstrations) has been limited by both gender and class (“Modest” 
224-25). Even now, “Colored, sexed, and laboring persons” encounter barriers in striving for the 
“transparency” that allows “modest” witnessing. Because of perceived bias, they are “the object of 
vision” rather than the viewer, and thus denied participatory agency (232-33). The controlled 
atmosphere of the experimental setting, the rhetorical format of the “unadorned, factual, 
compelling” reports, and the repetitive experimentation of scientific methodology all work together 
to form the credibility which becomes transparent factuality, and, over time, naturalized  “non-
dependent, disinterested truth-telling” (226, 232). In Oryx and Crake, the enduring belief in 
scientific neutrality ensures a gullible customer base for corrupt corporations, and veils damaging 
practices (such as disease-generating vitamins) from the view of external consumers and many of 
the Compound scientists (Oryx and Crake 211). Science is thus revealed as subject to corruption 
when shielded from multiple perspectives. 
In addition to the form and methodology of scientific practice, science’s lexical component also 
carries traces from earlier discourses. In her analysis of Linnaean nomenclature, Schiebinger 
demonstrates how a scientific paradigm arising from a gendered, socially-anchored framework 
can have a lasting influence on how we perceive the natural world. The labeling conventions 
Linnaeus attached to mammals, for instance, supported his era’s middle-class expectations of 
women’s social roles, and codified a “term, meaning literally ‘of the breast,’” to include humans 
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within a category of backboned animals which also contains “apes, monkeys, cows, whales, 
camels, and all other animals with hair, three ear bones, and a four-chambered heart.” Linnaeus’ 
system, which still prevails, has as much to do with the concerns of an eighteenth-century society 
worried over “wet-nursing and maternal breast-feeding, population growth, and the contested 
role of women in both science and society” as with the orderly cataloging of organic life 
(Schiebinger 4-5).20  
Linnaeus’ terminology and its underlying gendered representations are still in use in Oryx and 
Crake, naturalized to the point of invisibility. Extinctathon utilizes Linnaean nomenclature, and 
Crake masters it in his early teens; it becomes so integral to his vocabulary that when he and 
Jimmy espy Sharon in video footage of an environmental protest, Crake identifies her as 
“Phylum Chordata, Class Vertebrata, Order Mammalia, Family Primates, Genus Homo, species 
sapiens sapiens, subspecies your mother” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 182). Crake’s use of the 
language is rote, and neither he nor Jimmy signal an awareness of the gender significance their 
parlance conveys. Atwood’s presentation of this dialogue reaffirms our expectation that science 
contains its own language—separate, specific, and neutral. But the same naming convention used 
to categorize the feminine by a nurturative physical characteristic—mammary glands—identifies 
the masculine Homo by intellect, sapiens sapiens, subtly reifying the feminine/nature, 
masculine/intellect dichotomies. 
                                                 
20 Cell biologist Lynn Margulis cites the “inconsistencies, contradictions, and confusions” of the nomenclative 
system, and asserts the need for “one teachable scheme, an evolutionary system of classification, that reflects cell 
morphology, metabolism genetics, and developmental biology” as opposed to the existing inherited system (61-62). 
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The force of naturalization extends beyond appellations for biological entities, and saturates the 
language, tools, and methods of science. Examining modern science, Evelyn Fox Keller asserts a 
“new reading of the relations between science and nature,” one that starts “to unravel the 
insidious power of discourse to generate its own forms of truth” (52). Her field of expertise is 
molecular biology, the same terrain Atwood engages in her fictional universe. Keller examines 
naming from the perspective of the language used in redefining biological processes of life. Her 
concerns include the “Relocation of the essence” and “Redefinition of” the meaning of life, as 
well as the “Recasting of the goals of biological science.” Observing from a feminist perspective, 
Keller questions the reductionism narrowing the significance of life to simply “genetic material,” 
and defining life as “code” to be mastered (54-55).  
These concerns echo themes in Oryx and Crake, in Sharon’s accusations of “interfering with the 
building blocks of life,” an intervention in which she challenges the morality of Compound 
science. Jimmy’s father’s response reaffirms the real-world scientific perspective of life as 
simply something to be manipulated for human use (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 57). He does not 
acknowledge the webs of life of which these discrete elements are a part, nor does he recognize 
the unpredictable, cumulative effects human interference can produce. His response substantiates 
the reductionist lens employed by the Compound scientists in Oryx and Crake, which conceives 
no harm in dissecting and appropriating the life’s underlying components; humans have broken 
the code, and in doing so gained rightful mastery over nature. Morality can be shunted from the 
picture and taken out of the lab, since the processes of life have been rendered into constituent 
chemicals and molecules, renamed, and so repurposed. 
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While naming conventions reveal the connections between science and the masculine principle, 
nature and women are linked, as Carolyn Merchant observes, with “wild uncontrollable nature” 
historically connected with the feminine/organic principle (127). Nature, defined in terms of 
cultural projections, is linked to the female as a nurturing mother, a resource to be penetrated, a 
body to be sown and reaped, or a secret to be unlocked.21 The tradition connecting women and 
nature has a long history in western thought; from the masculine/mechanical perspective, nature 
is explained as a force to be brought to heel, so that her wealth can be put to use. Natural disorder 
is what science and technology intend to tame, through observation, experimentation, 
categorization, manipulation, and physical constraint, and woman’s affinity to nature means that 
she, too, must be controlled and tamed. As Donna Haraway hints, nature is a “dangerous female 
threatening manly knowers” (“Modest” 235). Nature and culture form a duality in which nature 
contributes to the advancement of Western civilization by suffering degradation, a situation 
regarded as progress in the mechanistic model  (Merchant 143), and in a “familiar patriarchal 
reduction,” the feminine is naturalized as closer to nature because of her procreative anatomy 
(Sturgeon 35). Women (such as Sharon) striving for an active role in the scientific disciplines 
must work against this essentialism; they must prove themselves the antithesis of naturalized 
actors, and in doing so must adopt and work within a paternalistic paradigm.22  
                                                 
21 Merchant describes the pre-mechanistic “metaphor of the earth as a nurturing mother” which “served as a cultural 
restraint . . . One does not readily slay a mother, dig into her entrails for gold or mutilate her body” (2-3). During the 
Renaissance, a still-nurturing earth could be “tamed and subdued . . . to provide both material and spiritual food” 
(8). Page duBois relates the Classical Greeks used earth metaphors describing a woman’s body as a field to be 
plowed or as a furrow “to receive the seeds of her husband and to nurture his crop” (39, 72), and Maria Mies and 
Vandana Shiva assert the Enlightenment idea of progress was predicated on “dominance over nature, including 
human, female nature” (336).
22 Noël Sturgeon defines “gender essentialism” as “arguments that unproblematically connect ‘women’ with 
‘nature,’ assuming a universal essential feminine identity constructed out of biological femaleness that exists cross-
culturally and across racial and class structures” (115). 
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The historic complexity of feminine participation in the scientific community is evident in Oryx 
and Crake: the women who are involved with Compound science are either implicated and amoral, 
as in the case of Crake’s nameless mother, Jimmy’s step-mother Ramona, and the “woodpecker 
yodel” researcher at Watson-Crick (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 212, 175, 203); or ethically tortured 
to the point of removing themselves from collusion, as in Sharon’s case (61). The women who 
knowingly collaborate in Oryx and Crake’s questionable genetic interventions have assimilated 
into the mechanistic worldview, knowing that to succeed in a man’s world they cannot question the 
existing edifices. They “have ‘opted in,’” as Cooke observes, by “internalize[ing] the goals, truth, 
and ethics of the company as their own.” Cooke links this conformity to “corporate ‘yes’ culture” 
(111), but it can also be construed as representative of anyone with less power securing access by 
remaining quiet. Those who do question—Sharon, Bernice (Jimmy’s first college roommate), and 
the members of the radical environmental group God’s Gardeners—are perceived as irrational, 
anti-social, and dangerous: Sharon is Jimmy’s “real, strange, insufficient, miserable” and “deviant 
mother” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 67, 182); Bernice is “reality-challenged in a major way” (189); 
and God’s Gardeners are “some bunch of wackos” (213). Labeling dissidents justifies 
establishment responses: those who go against the grain are a danger to civil society. Sharon’s 
fate—execution by firing squad—is a warning against subversion, but also a warning against 
challenging the semi-sacral notion of scientific progress. 
The Digital Feminine 
Technology, not science, serves as the key element defining Oryx. Her very presence in the 
narrative is attributed to her online subjugation as a child sex-slave; without witnessing her 
“performance,” Jimmy would not have become infatuated, and Crake would not have located 
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and procured her. The placement of Oryx to illustrate the entwined issues of internet child 
pornography and sexual slavery is heightened by her exotic appeal. She is a cipher both refuting 
and supporting the idea of empowerment through sexuality, yet she is distanced from Jimmy’s 
world geographically and culturally as well as by the recording eye of the movie camera. Tolan 
aligns Jimmy’s fascination with Oryx with Edward W. Said’s “pleasurably distanced voyeurism” 
of the Orient that the European observer enjoys, commenting that the “sense of otherness is 
maintained by the unspecified eastern location and the young Asian girls being abused” (288). 
Jimmy’s initial appreciation of Oryx stems from her cinematic appearance and the reality she 
suddenly imposes on the “three layers of contradictory make-believe, one on top of the other”; 
her ability to look “right into the eyes of the viewer” momentarily reveals the theatrical spell 
implicit in such viewing (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 90-91). According to Said, western 
representations of Orientalism gain power from theatricality: “the Orient is the stage on which 
the whole East is confined” (Said 63). This “closed field” of the stage provides an understanding 
of the Orient for westerners by westerners; the mystery associated with the landscape and people 
is a construct mysterious only to its architects. The medium of the internet, combined with the 
editing capacity of film, provide the perfect stage for reinscribing pre-determined illusions. 
Jimmy’s resistance to Oryx’s later explanations can thus be construed as a reaction attributable to 
his preordained notion of her history—he is looking for confirmation of the reality he imagined, 
not an explanation of Oryx’s true experiences.  
Computer and film technology act as cultural filters in Oryx and Crake to distribute packaged 
reality. The screens of computer and television, digital interfaces that can be manipulated, edited, 
and presented as veracity, shape Jimmy’s and Crake’s concepts of both the natural world and 
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human culture. Atwood writes that the information Jimmy and Crake acquire is controlled 
through technology: “What they can grasp of the rest of the world comes to them through 
television and the Internet, and is thus suspect, because edited” (The Handmaid’s 517). Besides 
gaming, the internet provides a venue for sexuality for the young Jimmy and Crake, but the view 
it projects is linked to physical degradation and violence; sex is consumed at the same time and 
in the same manner as online executions, torture, and animal cruelty.  
The casual commodification of sex and violence is pervasive in Jimmy’s experience, and the 
same film technology used to teach about the “copulation and growling and innards” of the 
natural world is used to objectify the human body as merely a vessel for physical release. The 
“animal behavior” educational videos from Jimmy’s childhood give way to graphic depictions 
of sexuality, perversity, and violence delivered seamlessly and effortlessly through the 
computer terminal (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 10, 82-83). Jimmy’s exposure to explicit online 
content impresses him with the similarities—“If you switched back and forth” between the 
violence and pornography, “it all came to look like the same event”—and leaves him “feeling 
as if . . . he’d had no control at all over what had happened to him” (86-87). The vicarious 
specular nature of the boys’ viewing objectifies all of the entities visible through the monitor, 
and while Jimmy has visceral reactions to some of the grotesqueries, he in unable or unwilling 
to cease participation. The technological interface of the computer has become, in effect, his 
mode of socialization, and his ensuing perception of other genders, cultures, or creatures is 
tainted by this formative period in his life.  
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In an essay on the subject of porn, Atwood affirms that “a large part of the market for all kinds of 
porn, soft and hard, is drawn from the 16-to-21-year-old population of young men,” and they 
experience it as “an educational tool and a powerful propaganda device” (“Pornography” 426). 
Her contention is that porn is not simple entertainment, but a force that actively shapes young 
lives. Bouson writes that Atwood “conveys her uneasiness” with pornography by portraying “the 
degradation of culture in a society where violence and pornography have become cheap, and 
readily available, forms of entertainment” (143). Atwood herself notes that describing porn as 
merely entertainment is problematic and misses the central question of “What’s the harm?” 
(“Pornography” 425). In Oryx and Crake, we see the harm as the teenage Jimmy’s perspective 
on relationships reflects his desensitization; in remembering an early girlfriend, he reveals “He 
didn’t like [LyndaLee] much, but he needed to keep up with her, make sure he was still on her 
list,” and contemplates “get[ting] Crake into the queue” to solidify their emerging friendship 
(Oryx and Crake 73). A girl is a “something” to be used and shared, not a “someone” with whom 
to have a relationship. 
Jimmy first sees Oryx while he and Crake are watching a child porn site called “HottTotts” (88). 
Oryx looks “right into Jimmy’s eyes, into the secret person inside of him,” provoking his first 
intimation that the actors might be more than “digital clones,” and that the casual pornography he 
and Crake consumed might be “wrong” and not just “entertainment, or beyond his control” (90-
91). Oryx provides a contradictory character in terms of feminist agendas. While Sharon’s 
struggle is clear-cut resistance to a traditional patriarchal enemy, the institution of the 
Compounds, Oryx’s struggles are contested with non-figured opponents: poverty, environmental 
degradation, and commodified sexuality. She has fictitious names, many stories, and many faces: 
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third-world peasant, child sex slave, prostitute, teacher, lover, and goddess. Oryx is multiple 
versions of the feminine, originating from myriad experiences; her relationship with Jimmy only 
emphasizes her synthesized identity, which encompasses rural/urban, organic/mechanized, and 
metaphysical/scientific domains. Her negotiation of these dichotomies defies a westernized 
version of feminism, challenging concepts of culture, race, gender, and essence. By bringing 
Oryx into the location of white, westernized, scientific culture, Atwood positions her as a 
contradictory vision of sexual potency and western exploitation.  
Oryx’s back-story—or at least the history that Jimmy constructs for her—is one of survival. As a 
small child, she is sold into sexual slavery and used by a series of pimps, pornographic movie 
producers, and wealthy western customers. Her sexuality is the force that captivates Jimmy, but 
this sexuality is part of her façade, a pose she adopts to stay alive, fulfill an obligation, extend 
gratitude, or empathetically extend balm for a tortured soul. Even as she assures Jimmy that her 
relationship with him is “for fun,” her veracity is in doubt because she also displays a willingness 
to say whatever he wants to hear, “to pretend” or “make something up” (Atwood, Oryx and 
Crake 313, 92). Although Oryx’s sexuality gives her an aura of agency in “the body-identified 
and sex-addicted postfeminist world of the future” (Bouson 147), it is problematic. A 
postfeminist appraisal of sexuality and even pornography includes 
. . . the notion that femininity is a bodily property; the shift from objectification to 
subjectification; the emphasis upon self-surveillance, monitoring and discipline; a 
focus upon individualism, choice and empowerment; the dominance of a 
makeover paradigm; a resurgence in ideas of natural sexual difference; a marked 
sexualization of culture; and an emphasis upon consumerism and the 
commodification of difference. (Gill 14) 
 59
 
Using her sexuality to manipulate men, Oryx admits she “feel[s] strong to know that the men 
thought she was helpless but she was not” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 133), but while she learns 
to maximize her survival chances through the use of sex, it does not necessarily impart agency or 
power. As Tolan observes, Oryx’s sexuality is not freely hers to give, but is instead constrained 
by “capitalist power structures” (290). While Oryx can be acknowledged as “one of Atwood’s 
most ambiguous characters,” reflecting “something of the multiplicity of feminist responses” 
within the area of sexuality and agency (286), she only appears to fit a postfeminist agenda.  
Although she escapes her sex-trade past and dons a business suit and briefcase, Oryx still 
reminds us of “the ‘two-thirds world’ girls and women who are being brutalized by the capitalist 
global economy in sweatshops, the maid trade, and the sex trade” (Mack-Canty 164). The same 
westernized global economy responsible for the altered climate and mass extinctions generates 
the demand for digitized and actual sex workers, fueling the process which gives Oryx’s body a 
monetary value in the first place. But while a second-wave feminist perspective might be 
tempted to view her body as simply an expression “of oppression, exploitation, misrecognition, 
and disrespect" (Herr 80), Oryx’s complex message asserts that sex work is her door into western 
culture. Passively accepting her always-changing circumstances, she reminds Jimmy that the 
men who bought, traded, and owned her ultimately made it possible for her to be with him. 
Oryx’s story reveals the consequences of western apathy, ennui, and hedonism. While those with 
access to material resources use science and technology to focus on vanity and the physical 
appearance of eternal youth, people existing at the subsistence level are bereft of science or 
technology that would help them deal with the effects of global warming; they are particularly 
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vulnerable to the aftermath of climate change. Colleen Mack-Canty reveals third-world 
susceptibility as an issue concerning the third-wave movement of postcolonial feminists and 
ecofeminists, noting “women and their children, in particular, are severely affected by 
insufficient food, the rising cost of living, declining services, and eroding economic and 
environmental conditions” (165). The situation to which Oryx’s family is subject is a chain 
reaction of unforeseen consequences: flooding in some parts of the globe and droughts resulting 
in crop failures in others.  
Atwood’s projections emphasize the unequal distribution of suffering between first and third-
world experiences: in America, people simply move away from the flooded areas, but in Oryx’s 
home country, there is no moving away from the suddenly unproductive land, and no escape 
except through death or slavery. With nothing to market or eat, selling children becomes a 
rational, yet dehumanizing, response. Oryx recalls as much to Jimmy, explaining that the large 
family which would have been an asset in maintaining a farm becomes a liability when crops fail 
and her father dies, because “if there was no man to work in the fields or in the rice paddies, then 
the raw materials of life had to come from somewhere else” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 116). 
Seen as such, Oryx is subject to western excesses on every front: her family and her village are 
pre-industrial, and thus not implicated in the production of greenhouse gases; furthermore, the 
men who purchase and trade her use her beauty to extract money from rich westerners. Her 
trajectory is shaped by what Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva term “the capitalist patriarchal 
world system” which originates from and continues “through the colonization of women, of 
‘foreign’ peoples and their lands; and of nature” ( 333). Oryx may thus represent the endangered 
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(soon to be extinct) human species: her original community suffers from habitat loss, 
environmental spoilage, and exploitation as organic commodities. 
Renaming the Feminine 
Oryx never presents a solid identity; we hear the name she received after her mother sold her—
“SuSu”—but never learn her birth name (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 129). When she has the 
choice of her own name, it is still from a list provided by a man (Crake), and based on Crake’s 
game of Extinctathon. She takes the name Oryx from “a gentle water-conserving East African 
herbivore,” not understanding the Extinctathon predicate of selecting only organisms which are 
already extinct (311). Her upset at discovering this rationale reveals the import she places on 
self-naming; most of the appellations she carries are descriptions of how she is perceived in 
society and are given by men, for men: sex slave, prostitute, and sex worker. For her to be able to 
choose her own name is therefore a significant statement, an assertion of identity. Signifying that 
language can liberate as well as constrain, Oryx trades sex for English lessons, the language she 
associates with opportunity (255). Though she lost her first language—“the words had been 
scoured out of her head”—she willfully captures new languages, understanding the power words 
engender (115).  
Regardless of Oryx’s attempts to establish self-definition, the perceptions of the masculine 
figures in her life limit and construct her potential. Rosalind Gill notes that “Girls and women are 
invited to become a particular kind of self, and are endowed with agency,” by men, but that 
agency is predicated on the “condition that it is used to construct oneself as a subject closely 
resembling the heterosexual male fantasy found in pornography” (152). Oryx is still at the mercy 
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of the masculine forces in her life; caught between Crake’s “alpha wolf” and Jimmy’s “jackal” 
positions (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 300), she is unable to become other than that which they 
perceive. The image of her child-pornography, the revelation of her physical perfection, and her 
naturalized femininity continue to shape her identity even after her death.  
As his ideal of femininity, Oryx lives ghost-like in Jimmy’s memory. Before he meets her in the 
RejoovenEsense Compound, Jimmy carries the printout from the long-ago website, measuring 
all other women against her iconicity. After the epidemic, Snowman returns to his mental 
construct of her, reviving her in his memory. The metaphysical manifestation of Oryx is very 
real to him: “Sometimes he can conjure her up,” “he can feel Oryx floating towards him through 
the air, as if on soft feathery wings” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 110, 113). Through the lens of his 
fixation, Jimmy constructs a mythology of Oryx as the mother/nature-goddess for the Crakers, 
telling them the “Children of Oryx hatched out of an egg, a giant egg laid by Oryx herself,” and 
reminding them to return the fish bones to the sea so “she can make other children out of them” 
(96, 101). The image of the goddess, as Tolan notes, is associated with second-wave feminism 
(291), but Snowman’s invocation can also be viewed as a further attempt to capture Oryx’s 
essence; through imposing his own language upon her after her death, he defines who she was.  
In Oryx and Crake, feminine renaming is an act of agency, an attempt at self-liberation. The act 
is only partially successful: Sharon is efficacious at removing herself from the Compound life 
and establishing a redefined persona—even her own son recognizes she is no longer the mother 
figure he once knew—but her new identity does not protect her from execution. Oryx 
accomplishes her redefinition under the umbrella of a masculine framework which requires her 
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continued participation in expected behaviors. Sharon and Oryx each exhibit a different 
mechanism for action: Sharon pulls away from the ethical stance of the Compounds, fighting 
against the grain, and Oryx accepts and acquiesces, not questioning any of the science and 
technology she witnesses, and unwittingly participating in Crake’s extinction plot for humanity.  
Renaming includes reclaiming along with reconceptualizing, and in this context we return to 
Adamic nominal assignments. In her short story “She Unnames Them,” Ursula K. Le Guin 
allocates the ability to erase nomenclature to her feminine narrator. This nameless woman finds 
“unnaming” the animals makes them appear “far closer than when their names had stood 
between [her] and them like a clear barrier” (2233). The human/nonhuman separation has been 
weakened by this nameless state; the possibility of both danger and knowledge is thus 
unwrapped. From the creatures’ viewpoint, most “agreed enthusiastically to give their names 
back to the people to whom—as they put it—they belonged,” shedding “all the Linnaean 
qualifiers that had trailed along behind them for two hundred years like tin cans tied to a tail” 
(2232-33). Le Guin unites the nonhuman with the feminine in this preference, showing that even 
those without a voice prefer going unnamed; their identity is something better defined through 
their own recognition. Sharon and Oryx find unnaming much more difficult, with not just change 
of nomenclature, but loss of life seemingly the only path out of the construct. The final identity 
for each exists only in the fractious, searching thoughts and memories of the last man, Snowman.  
As the feminine is perceived and dominated through the lens of nature, so the natural world itself 
is subject to domination. The Adamic principle assigns dominion to the sons of Adam, and the 
right of people to enjoy this privilege is challenged only when humans attempt to view nature as 
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a shared space. Agency depends on recognition of response, not just reaction, and even some 
within the human species are denied this recognition. Those who have no voice at all—animal 
others—are therefore doubly proscribed as objects, both in their silence and their difference. In 
the next chapter, I will show that Atwood’s fictive portrayal of the human/nonhuman interface 
invites reassessing the animal other, and reveals humanism’s expropriation of animal agency as a 














CHAPTER FOUR: (UN)NATURAL BODIES 
Extinction and Revision 
Atwood’s future scenario is not a picture of what she imagines the world will be like in a few 
years, but a surmise of what it could be like if current scientific, technological, and commercial 
trends continue (Halliwell 260). By extrapolating these trends into possible or even probable 
outcomes, Atwood pictures a human-defined environment shorn from its natural moorings; a 
world in which manipulation of nature has reached a logical, if illusionary, apex. Oryx and 
Crake’s macrocosm strikes us as strange on multiple fronts—the waning age of humans, the 
Mesozoic climate, and the genetically mixed-up life-forms. This alterity awakens another 
thought: if the earth exists for the benefit of humanity (as perceived through religious and 
humanist lenses), then what is the meaning of the world with humanity gone? Through the figure 
of Crake, with assistance from his human (Oryx and Jimmy) and technological (computer and 
Compound science) tools, the humanist paradigm runs into an impermeable wall, one it is 
undeniably complicit in constructing.  
As the narratives of extinction wend their way through the different time frames of Atwood’s 
text, it becomes clear that creation and destruction are inevitably entwined. The natural systemic 
transformations of evolution and extinction shape life on earth, with organic life following the 
contours of geologic time and place. The scientists of Oryx and Crake deliberately insert 
themselves into the natural transformations of evolution and extinction in their attempts to 
control nature, following an instrumentalist tradition that holds humans outside of natural 
processes. Murphy cites “individualism” as the rationale in the rejection of evolution in humans 
and the persistent dichotomy separating humans and nature (144). Humanist, empiricist, and 
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religious lenses legitimize humanity’s consumptive habits through self-separation from, and 
ascendance over, other life forms, and evolutionary forces which propelled the human species’ 
success compound this perception with adaptive intelligence and tool-making skill. Humans rise 
to the peak hierarchy of the great chain of being, asserting self-rationalized superiority through 
material culture and technological invention that, in turn, justify mindless consumption.23
Atwood credits William Blake with recognizing that “human imagination drives the world,” 
noting that imagination now encompasses the natural world as well as the human in its effects: 
“we have our hand upon the throttle and our eye upon the rail, and we think we’re in control of 
everything” (“The Handmaid’s Tale and” 517). The intervention into natural evolution 
accompanying human consumption is not unique to Atwood’s future, though; for thousands of 
years, humans have selected and bred organisms for desired features, enacting genetic 
modifications over multiple generations. In Oryx and Crake‘s technology-centered Compounds, 
though, the pace has accelerated, and computers and bioscience enable gene-splice manipulation 
inconceivable before the digital age. Contemporary concerns over genetically modified 
organisms, or GMOS, are magnified through Atwood’s descriptions of mutated species, and 
processes which took generations in prior hybridizations now take just a few years. The final 
destructive potential of Oryx and Crake’s bioscience is realized in the deadly hemorrhagic virus 
designed by Crake. 
                                                 
23 Schiebinger describes the great chain of being as a “fixed and vertical hierarchy stretching from God above down 
to the lowliest sentient being.” This doctrine supported a telos of natural hierarchies underlying social hierarchies in 
relation to the races of man (Schiebinger 145). I am extending it to include all creatures, sentient and non-sentient. 
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In building the Oryx and Crake universe, Atwood utilizes contemporary gene studies as the basis 
for her conjectures. Going far beyond GMOs for food production, she imagines biomedical and 
commercial applications thrust onto a public greedy for immortality and numbed to novelty. A 
few creations already exist outside fiction: the rabbit that glows neon green, and the goat that 
produces spider silk in its milk.24 Such inventions’ derivation does not fit the same mold as 
historic genetic improvements such as wheat, corn, barley, and rice from wild grasses, or 
milkable cows and horses from their wild kin. The altered rabbit and goat are not the result of 
human-influenced intraspecific breeding practices (which are not entirely innocent either), but 
mixed-species combinations.25 Novel because of its non-natural guise, this type of production 
would not occur without human intervention: the computer and syringe have replaced 
reproductive union within species. Humans have graduated from simply experiencing genesis 
through the naming process and progressed to engendering synthetic biological entities.  
The destructive aftermath of liberated human creativity emerges in the Compounds, where 
scientists produce bizarre as well as utilitarian creatures: “create-an-animal was so much fun, 
said the guys doing it; it made you feel like God” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 51). Genetic 
engineering, as Regine Kollek explains, makes it “possible to overcome the barriers which 
normally limit the arbitrary cross-breeding of organisms of different species” (97). The resulting 
                                                 
24 In a presentation at MIT in 2004, Atwood notes that her fiction in Oryx and Crake is “not pure invention . . . the  
spider goat is with us today, and so is the luminous green rabbit” (Oryx and Crake Revealed). The effort to develop 
a new “means of production” for spider silk led to the development of a transgenic goat which makes “beautiful, 
water-soluble, authentic spider silk” in its milk (Gould 44), and artist Eduardo Kac, with the assistance of a team of 
scientists, created Alba, “a transgenic artwork,” in 2000. The albino rabbit Alba, recipient of synthesized jellyfish 
genetic material, glows green under certain lighting (Kac 97). 
25 Inbreeding popular domestic animals such as purebred dog or cat breeds can weaken genetic diversity and lead to 
inherited diseases. Donna Haraway provides an example in her discussion of Australian Shepherds; describing the 
occurrence of the inherited eye disease CEA in the breed, she notes the condition was made worse by “overuse in 
the 1980s of a few popular sires” (When Species 115). 
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organisms are not coevolved with an environment, but outliers in the intricate web of natural 
processes. Some creations, like the glowing rabbits and gentle rakunks, are perceived as benign 
and even playful, while others must be destroyed as too dangerous, such as the snats, “Rats with 
long green scaly tails and rattlesnake fangs,” and the cane toad-chameleon hybrid (224, 51). 
Other manufactured hybrids include the wolvogs, bobkittens, and pigoons, creatures which 
overwhelm the natural fauna once released from human captivity.26 The creations with the 
greatest alterity, though, are the hybrid humans Crake engineers as humanity’s successors, 
beings exhibiting multiple nonhuman characteristics from their animal kingdom genetic donors. 
The ultimate eugenics experiment, the Crakers embody an anti-humanist rationale, with survival, 
not culture, their dominant trait. 
While J. Brooks Bouson views the “transgenic species” in Atwood’s menagerie as a mockery of 
genetic engineering and the contemporary debate over the ethics and ownership of genetic 
potential (140), Grayson Cooke perceives “rhetorical glee” in the blitz of inventive names 
Atwood assigns, language defining the novel’s “fully altered” and “fully alterable world” (109). 
The genetically modified creatures of Oryx and Crake, as Danette Dimarco points out, represent 
the natural world’s instrumentality in the hands of scientists such as Crake, material 
representations “grounded repeatedly in a violation of nature.” She calls attention to Crake’s 
emphasis on human ingenuity while he concurrently deemphasizes nature’s originary importance 
(181-82). Similarly, Jayne Glover notes that scientists playing God have “been blamed for the 
objectification of nature—thus leading to the use of nature as instrument or object” (52). Even 
the originary value of humans is called into question in the humanoid Crakers; they and the 
                                                 
26 Eschewing Linnaean tradition, Atwood names her hybrid imaginary creatures instead with descriptive amalgams. 
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pigoons trouble what Chung-Hao Ku describes as “the fine line between humanity and 
monstrosity,” challenging “what it means to be human in the age of transgenics” (109). I 
propose that Atwood’s text also challenges the idea of natural hierarchical order and human 
exceptionalism, and that, through Oryx and Crake’s un-natural selection, opens a conversation 
on human-animal relationships, responsibility and non-human sentience. 
Biophobia 
As noted in chapter one, Oryx and Crake’s environs exacerbate human/nature estrangement, a 
factor made explicit in Snowman’s attitude toward the post-epidemic jungle-like ecology. His 
daily ritual includes contests with the biting insects and vigilance against “scales and tails” 
(Atwood, Oryx and Crake 4); the untamed world offers few chances at transcendent communion. 
Brief occasions hint at Snowman’s dormant biolphilia, such as his experiencing “a sudden, 
inexplicable surge of tenderness and joy,” an “irrational happiness” while watching a caterpillar. 
Snowman’s biophilic experience with the caterpillar brings the conjecture that it is aware of his 
presence: “Maybe it’s smelling him, picking up on his chemical aura.” He notes “There will 
never be another such moment of time, another such conjunction,” but he then discounts the 
experience as “probably a vitamin deficiency” (41). His willingness to place this experience on a 
par with his starvation-induced hallucinations indicates that, though he is immersed in it, 
Snowman is not comfortable with nature. 
Because of the child Jimmy’s empathic response to the burning pile of infected livestock, 
DiMarco posits his “potential to see himself as connected with nature” (188), but the moments of 
empathy are overshadowed by disengagement, fear, and resentment. Snowman’s tree residence is 
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a response to the biting ants, nuisance rakunks, curious pigoons, and hungry wolvogs; he even 
perceives the crawling “Beetles, flies, bees” as regarding him as “dead meat” (38-39). His primal 
response is situated in terms of survival against both naturally-occurring organisms and creatures 
which do not share a co-evolutionary path with humans. Those that do share a partial companion 
species bond with humans, such as the wolvogs, have been transformed by science into 
perversions of their originary stock. “Gazing at Jimmy with eyes of love” and “wagging their 
tails,” the wolvogs trigger Jimmy’s desire for a pet, but they merely mime affection; in actuality, 
“bred to deceive,” they embody human duplicity (205). As Snowman muses, “It hasn’t taken 
much to reverse fifty thousand years of man-canid interaction,” only the instrumental approach 
of human creativity (108). 
The one living, breathing creature to which young Jimmy becomes attached is his pet rakunk, 
Killer, a “clean animal, with a nice disposition” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 51). Jimmy’s name 
for Killer is an act of rebellion against his mother, Sharon, but it is also an oppositional 
appellation for the “placid” little animal. Killer is a human construct, a skunk without the odor, 
and a raccoon without destructive tendencies; she is an example of nature for human purpose, 
altered, tamed and subdued. Regardless of Killer’s lineage, Jimmy “fell in love with it” 
immediately (51), affirming that gene-spliced, bio-engineered beings also merit a place in the 
ethical discussion.27 Killer, “His secret best friend,” provides Jimmy with unconditional 
affection and acceptance; she is “the only person he could really talk to” (59). Sharon’s 
                                                 
27 Kac notes Alba, the “GFP Bunny,” is “like any other rabbit” in sociability. She needs “interaction through 
communication signals, voice and physical contact” (99). His art project is an exploration of human/nonhuman 
relationships, and the ethical, political, and social ramifications of genetic manipulation, and he points to Alba in 
asserting “transgenic animals are normal creatures that are as much part of social life as any other life-form and thus 
are deserving of as much love and care as any other animal” (100).  
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disappearance signals the loss not just of Jimmy’s mother, but his beloved pet as well; he mourns 
both “for months” (61). 
Interestingly, Snowman shares none of young Jimmy’s affection for rakunks, describing the 
“annoyingly large population of them” living in close proximity to him, and their tendency to 
“nos[e] around him as if he were already garbage” (61, 38). The appearance of one of the 
animals covertly observing him triggers the response that “If he worked at it, if he really tried, he 
could probably tame one” (49), but it is an opportunity he does not pursue. Snowman’s 
reluctance to engage with the rakunk might be taken as symbolic of his larger rejection of nature: 
the creature which brought him so much happiness as a child is now just another annoyance in 
the untamed wilderness. Even the dogs that lose their masters to the epidemic, the “woebegone 
house pets . . . begging with bewildered eyes to be taken in by some human, any human,” fail to 
get past Snowman’s resistance, and are rejected as “useless to him” (108). 
Voiceless Properties: Animal Justice 
From an ecocritical perspective, Atwood’s text opens up multiple questions of ethical animal 
treatment, including our knowledge of what we eat and how it is produced. When Snowman 
recalls his childhood, he remembers he “thought of the pigoons as creatures much like himself. 
Neither he nor they had a lot of say in what was going on” (24). Both suffer from a lack of 
agency, a lack of voice: the pigoons as silent animals, and Jimmy as the powerless witness to 
his parent’s dysfunction. The pigoons, used as organ banks, are developed “to grow an 
assortment of foolproof human-tissue organs in a transgenic knockout pig host” (22). The 
pigoons are not intended for use as a food source because “no one would want to eat an animal 
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whose cells might be identical with at least some of their own” (24). Nonetheless, suspicions 
exist because of the first generation’s single-use nature: harvesting organs requires killing 
pigoons. When Compound employees in the staff cafeteria refer to the pork dishes available on 
the menu by joking about “Pigoon pie again,” young Jimmy is disturbed; his intuitive kinship 
with the pigoons renders their consumption akin to cannibalism (24). Later, as he slowly 
starves, Snowman envisions “a pigoon feast,” accepting the taboo of potential cannibalism as a 
means of “Bring[ing] home the bacon” (150-51). 
Wendell Berry recognizes “that food is a cultural product,” and “A healthy culture . . . clarifies 
our inescapable bonds to the earth and to each other” (43). Corporatized farming methods 
commoditize food culture, and sever the natural bonds of which Berry speaks.28 Atwood takes 
industrial agriculture methods to the logical extreme with “ChickieNobs,” an assembly-line all 
breast-meat chicken that reduces the animal to just the muscle tissue humans find tasty. 
“ChickieNobs” are developed to offset protein shortages brought about when existing industrial 
farming is impacted by climate change and overpopulation. At the Watson-Crick Institute, 
Jimmy witnesses “a large bulblike object . . . covered with stippled whitish-yellow skin. Out of it 
came twenty thick fleshy tubes, and at the end of each tube another bulb was growing” (Atwood, 
Oryx and Crake 203).  The removal of the head and brain in what Donna Haraway terms “organs 
without organisms” is intended to allay concerns over suffering (When Species 268), but even 
the Compound-born Jimmy calls “The thing . . . a nightmare” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 202). 
Nevertheless, he eventually bypasses his reservations on eating the end product, later remarking 
                                                 
28 Industrial farming challenges ethical understandings of human relationships with the animal other, and using 
“animals as machines,” as Berry points out, also “creates an enormous pollution problem” (62). 
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“the stuff wasn’t that bad if you could forget everything you knew about the provenance” (242). 
As in his internet viewing habits, Jimmy illustrates the mindless consumption of which humans 
are capable, and his easy participation in a cycle which he himself found abhorrent at first is an 
indictment of human lassitude in the face of natural dissolution.  
Raising the question of human responsibility with his analysis of “the animal,” Jacques Derrida 
notes that the last two hundred years have seen exponential increases in our attempts to separate 
ourselves from the not-human (“The Animal” 393-94). We strive for disengagement through and 
because of the technology of industrial/post-industrial culture, to serve contemporary human 
demands. Derrida asserts this separation occurs through modernized, mechanized farming; 
industrial methodologies in animal meat production; processes such as artificial insemination and 
genomic manipulation for over-production; and the commercial use of animals for “all sorts of 
other end products” for “the so-called human well-being of man” (394). Kate Rigby adds to the 
discussion by stressing the “ecocidal” effects of “The hyperseparation that segregates the human 
other from other others,” and calling for “an ecological ethics, in which we are accountable to 
more than only human others” (176). Accountability is not merely a question of how we treat 
nonhuman entities, but how we acknowledge our own human existence in relation to the ecology 
of the biosphere. In Oryx and Crake, Atwood illustrates that, while maintaining human 
separation from natural processes allows us to ignore such ramifications for a while, ultimately 
we must face our ties to the physical earth. Decisions reached from a stance of separatism or 
human exceptionality, such as manufacturing organ-donor pigs which must be sacrificed for 
human use, only examine ethical action from the narrow perspective of the human.  
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By juxtaposing Extinctathon’s vanished natural species against bio-engineered organisms, 
Atwood makes clear that if a creature is useful or profitable to humans, it need not fear 
extinction—only utilitarian appropriation.29 Haraway suggests the terminology “‘endangered 
species’” works “simultaneously to locate value and evoke death and extinction in ways familiar 
in colonial representations of the always vanishing indigene,” and she situates “the colonized, the 
enslaved, the noncitizen, and the animal” in the same discursive space (“Encounters” 100). Thus, 
the genetically modified organisms in Oryx and Crake are just the next-generation slaves, the 
voiceless properties in the Compound-plantations. Their utility to humanity establishes their 
valuation, a judgment enacted by humans and bypassing other considerations such as integrity of 
natural ecosystems or animal subjectivity; their disappearance, even at the hands of humans, can 
be returned to the natural world for absolution. While grave quantities of non-utilitarian natural 
species are allowed to disappear under the thrust of development and progress, pigoons and 
ChickieNobs pervade pre-JUVE Compound life. Atwood’s text informs that extinction is never 
that easy to justify, and human exceptionalism is no longer a blind we can hide behind. Oryx and 
Crake questions if extinction is a more serious condition when it threatens the human, as 
opposed to the nonhuman, and if the idea of justice applies to the nonhuman other.  
Listening to the Animal Other  
Cary Wolfe offers that Derrida utilizes the notion of “shared embodiment, mortality, and 
finitude” with nonhumans as criteria that “subsume the more traditional markers . . . such as the 
                                                 
29 Haraway observes that a lifestyle that “avoid[s] eating or wearing any animal products” in an effort to promote 
environmental ethics might unintentionally “consign most domestic animals to the status of curated heritage 
collections or to just plain exterminism” (When Species 80). This observation recognizes the economic imperatives 
of monoculture, or reducing livestock or crops to the most productive, profitable strain. Berry notes that the decline 
of “agricultural stability through diversity” has resulted in a system where “it is now, for the first time, deemed 
provident and wise to put all the eggs in one basket” (36).   
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capacity for reason, the ability to enter into contractual agreements or reciprocal behaviors” 
(“Flesh and Finitude” 8).30 Human exceptionalism depends on understanding the human as 
possessing qualities and capabilities unique to our species, attributes such as speech, problem-
solving, or empathy that present an insoluble barrier to the nonhuman other.31 But is the barrier 
impermeable or only unfathomable? If we drop the lens of humanism in our approach to the 
animal other—something I propose Atwood accomplishes in Oryx and Crake—will we discern 
an entity rather than a thing on the other side of the divide?  
Communication is one of those markers of separation, but it is an element which can and has 
been challenged. The “différend,” according to Jean-François Lyotard, is instability in language 
“wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be,” and he includes 
“silence,” the “negative phrase” within this concept (13). Bill Readings interprets Jean-François 
Lyotard’s usage of “différend” to explain the idea of a language/communication barrier so great 
it will never be breached (114).32 Readings explains the failure of the colonial Australian 
government to achieve justice with the aboriginal population through différend: the aboriginal 
view of the world is so alien to western ways of understanding that there are no words to close 
the gap (112, 120). Any words the government might use to interpret will only reassert colonial 
preconceptions. And the western view is just as alien to the aborigine; despite protests to the 
                                                 
30 According to Wolfe, to question “the ontological and ethical divide between humans and non-humans” and seek 
right action for the nonhuman leads us into the region of posthumanism (“Flesh and Finitude” 8).    
31 Franz de Waal’s primate studies look beyond strictly behaviorist paradigms and into empathic evidence: “group 
specific behaviours,” those actions which present evidence of a “collective mindset and shared knowledge in a 
group.” Other animals, such as “hyenas, dolphins, or wolves” also provide examples of nonhuman social 
relationships (de Waal and Thompson 48, 44). These developing recognitions of nonhuman emotive and cognitive 
potential further shake the inviolate humanist claim on uniqueness. 
32 While Lyotard analogizes that “the animal is a paradigm of the victim” for their lack of speech, he is not 
concerned with the différend between human and animal, but between human and human (28). 
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contrary, humanism is only universal to those enculturated to it. The barrier of différend is 
mutual, and prevents either party from recognizing the other as responsive entity.  
I assert the absent phrase or word of the différend also describes the broken discourse between 
humans and animal others. Historically, human minorities have been treated as not-human 
frequently enough to show the relevance of différend; animals have suffered because the 
différend between “us” and “them” is even greater. If it is difficult to achieve mutual 
communications between different groups of humans, is there any hope of understanding the 
nonhuman? If the indigene has such a disparate response and relation to temporal and physical 
reality, how different, then, must it be for creatures with divergent sensory organs? To be human 
is to be immersed in and defined by language as we understand it, communication composed of 
sound, gesture, and facial expression. But other creatures use different sensory apparatus for 
intraspecific communion, including, for some species, infrared vision, scent and body language, 
chemical markers, or hearing that extends into registers beyond human perception.33  
Atwood illustrates the gap between human and animal communications with Alex the parrot.34 
As a child, Jimmy comes across Alex in an educational video; in his loneliness he turns to the 
parrot as a kind of mascot. Alex creates a new word, “cork-nut,” to describe an almond. Jimmy, 
grasping the significance of the event, adopts the word as his personal slang. Alex also cuts off 
the experiment when he gets tired of it: “I’m going away now” (54). Jimmy knows if he had the 
                                                 
33 Butterflies, for example, locate their food sources in flowers by “pinpoint[ing] pollen and nectar . . . by the pattern 
of ultraviolet rays reflected off the petals” (Wilson, Consilience 46), and Louis M. Herman posits that bottlenosed 
dolphins are flexible communicators, and should be seen as “ multi-modal animals, interfacing with their world 
through vision as well as hearing and echolocation” (277).   
34 Alex the parrot was an actual subject in a study on animal behavior in language; while he did not use the word 
“cork-nut,” he did exhibit an understanding “that his labels are made of individual phonological units that can be 
recombined in novel ways to create novel vocalizations” (Pepperberg 3).  
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chance to meet Alex, “they’d be friends, they’d be brothers” (261). Alex seems to be attempting 
human language for the purpose of closing the gap, but we see no complementary effort on the 
part of his human handler.  Jimmy’s fascination with words—human communication—is the link 
that draws him to Alex; the door to understanding opens with a creature that approaches, even 
peripherally, human forms of verbal signifiers.  
In his critique of Lacan’s Cartesian approach to the subjectivity of the animal, Derrida asserts 
that the monolithic judgment on animality or humanity hinges on symbolic communication. 
Whereas Lacan differentiates between “signs for human language” and “animal coding,” Derrida 
challenges that the divergence is not so cleanly marked; the attributes of human language, such 
as signs that create meaning, “must be accorded to any code, animal or human” (“And Say” 
126). From another perspective, Murphy demonstrates the challenges faced even when both 
parties speak the same human language, but are of different genders. He queried his students on 
differing approaches to communicating with the opposite sex, and found the women more 
inclined to put forth the “active listening” effort to understand the “many realms of male 
discourse” (157-58) than men in a reciprocal situation. Murphy asks, “Is it the nature of 
language, of gender, or of a particular culture that generates asymmetrical structures of 
understanding difference? And if so many men are unwilling to learn the discourses of the other 
side of their own species, what about that of other species?” (158). Might the words and phrases 
in the animal others’ separate worlds not only exist, but exist in complex, non-instinctive forms 
beyond human notice or comprehension?  
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While human exceptionalism presupposes the divide, in Oryx and Crake the lines between 
human and not-human blur, becoming permeable. Lacking tongues and opposable thumbs, 
pigoons cannot produce words or even gestures; nonetheless, it’s not only possible, but probable 
that they share human intelligence because of the human brain tissue mixed into their genetic 
design.35 Snowman describes them as “A brainy and omnivorous animal,” as they coordinate 
their movements to entrap and ambush him in several instances (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 235, 
267, 271). Snowman is witness to the pigoons’ capacity to plan and organize, but here the 
différend is complicated by the overturned predator/prey relationship. As he observes, 
“pigoons have long memories,” and their interest in him has little to do with curiosity; rather, 
Snowman imagines they see him as “a delicious meat pie just waiting to be opened up.” Their 
self-directed behavior is indicative of agency, though, and challenges an anthropocentric 
reading. Pigoons, as “Team players,” are a rebuttal to the Cartesian machine animal (234, 268).  
The Crakers also play a part in demonstrating différend; as shown in chapter one, their language 
is disjointed from past cultural and physical realities. Snowman’s conversations with the Crakers 
are full of broken dialogue, as misunderstandings and questions proliferate. A simple slang 
expression from Snowman—“Piss off”—produces an untranslatable moment: “He’s made a 
mistake, he’s said a new thing, one that’s impossible to explain” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 9). 
Predominantly human in form, the Crakers are completely other in their communication and 
perception of the environment. Maybe the différend is simply too great a barrier to overcome. As 
                                                 
35 Describing the pigoons, Snowman notes that “if they’d had fingers they’d have ruled the world” (Atwood, Oryx 
and Crake 267). 
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Readings asserts, “the radical incommensurability between the two kinds of arguments” assures 
that neither party can even “recognize the other as an ‘argument’ at all” (115).  
The “universal dream” of western humanism (Readings 116) that segregates us inter-specially by 
race and geography also demands that the nonhuman be separated into a space of utility. Thus, 
the moral implications of genetically manipulating other species to increase their worth to 
humanity are rationalized through their anotherness. Ironically, the same science that promises 
human mastery over nature also reveals the connections humans share with the natural world, 
and call into question humanity’s current relationship with that world. As Glen A. Love states,  
recent scientific studies and findings deepen and complicate our understanding of 
the subject far beyond the simple categorizations of the past. We are increasingly 
led to the borders of our species, where, for example, we share over ninety-eight 
percent of our genetic makeup with the common chimpanzees, and where the 
ecological fascination with such edges is increasingly evident. (572) 
Atwood shows the ease with which scientific and commercial interests can ignore such 
biological enlightenment, to the detriment of all.  
Atwood exposes GMO technology as double-edged, as Crake performs the same cross-species 
alterations on the human animal that the other scientists are performing on pigs, chickens, and 
multiple other species. New understandings of the chemical and molecular connectivity of 
earthly organisms increasingly reveal human entanglement with the environment, and the 
artificial barriers of reason and speech fade in importance against the overarching struggle for 
survival witnessed in Oryx and Crake. In the conclusion, I will return to the concepts of 





Man, introverted man, having crossed 
In passage and but a little with the nature of things this 
        latter century 
Has begot giants; but being taken up 
Like a maniac with self-love and inward conflicts can- 
        not manage his hybrids. (1-6) 
                     Robinson Jeffers 
                                                                          “Science” 
 
Man is but a part of the fabric of life—dependent on the whole fabric for his very 
existence. As the most highly developed tool-using animal, he must recognize that 
the unknown evolutionary destinies of other life forms are to be respected, and act 
as gentle steward of the earth’s community of being.  (91) 
                          Gary Snyder 
                                                                “Four Changes” 
Lab Animal 
In Oryx and Crake, Atwood places humans in the position of the laboratory animal, as much a 
product of science and technology as the plants and animals we use and consume. In this, she 
recognizes and magnifies the fact that our domesticated hybrids have shaped humans and human 
culture just as we have shaped the organic world; coevolution has concurrently influenced 
human nature and Mother Nature. Jared Diamond outlines this concept in Guns, Germs, and 
Steel, explaining how higher food yields, concentrated populations, increased birth rates, and 
food surpluses made possible “settled, politically centralized, socially stratified, economically 
complex, technologically innovative societies” (89, 92). The evolutionary changes we have 
produced in others have shaped us as well, and the fictive alterations Atwood projects have 
similar, if more violent and drastic, effects on future humans.  
Atwood’s text fits what Rigby describes as “biting, stinging words of prophetic imagination,” 
(178), an unnerving vision of a “not-so-distant-future . . . world currently feared by 
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environmentalists” (Glover 52). We react to the dangerous hybrids from the Compound labs 
much like Jimmy, with revulsion and confusion, yet these biological perversions echo the 
cultural perversions Atwood puts forth in internet porn and violence, human slavery, and 
authoritarian justice. Even the celebration of humanist triumphs in literature, music, architecture, 
and art falls on the losing side in the video game Blood and Roses, portending humanity’s future. 
However, the most disturbing elements in Oryx and Crake may be those with a hint of 
familiarity, such as the internet games, corporate greed, animal abuse, and social constructs of 
race and gender that reflect the contemporary world: the wolvog, CorpSeCorp officer, and our 
contemporary banking crisis are all products of a culture that condones corporate greed.  
Bioengineered evolution as a malleable, controllable life process leads to extinction in the same 
vein; the God complex manifested in Crake and his fellow Compound scientists produces both 
creative and destructive outcomes. Crake, who believes in neither God nor Nature, valorizes 
human creativity and unabridged progress in his Watson-Crick phase, but later observes that “As 
a species we’re in deep trouble, worse than anyone’s saying” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 206, 
295). The terminology “as a species” reaffirms humanity’s ties to other organisms, and imputes a 
biological problem (and possibly a biological solution). In Crake, though, the confusion of 
human exceptionalism and nihilistic cynicism produces the lethal effect of narrow empirical 
androcentrism, as his inventiveness provides only extinction as a logical solution to planetary 
survival: “You’ve got to work with what’s on the table” (293). As Cooke notes, “Crake is a 
biological determinist, believing also in a logical biology, a biologic of sense” (119). For Crake, 
an elegant solution is logical and linear, never organic or rhizhomic. Speaking of the construction 
of the Crakers, Crake tells Jimmy “It was the result of a logical chain of progression” (Atwood, 
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Oryx and Crake 302), extending Atwood’s concerns about “single-issue, single-focus thinkers” 
(Atwood, qtd. in Halliwell 260). In Crake, Atwood illustrates the double edge of science, the 
capacity for comprehension that can be subverted by egoistic drive and commercial profit. 
Technoscience thus portrayed is a seductive virulence, a human creation capable of trivializing 
all other human creations. 
The women of Oryx and Crake further highlight the suspect uses to which science and 
technology are applied. Acknowledging the troubled history of exclusion and essentialism in 
women’s relationships with science, Sharon and Oryx provide ambiguous hints of feminist 
agency in Atwood’s dystopia. Both can be seen as figures enjoining nature with technology. 
Oryx is born in an Asian village surrounded by parched farms, the forest, and wild creatures, yet 
she ends her story in a Compound, Atwood’s symbol for corporate technological/scientific 
elitism. Traveling from one extreme—third-world poverty and sexual slavery—to another—the 
privileged inner sanctum of the RejoovenEsense Compound—she becomes associated with the 
most complex forms of biotechnology yet, the humanoid Crakers and the JUVE pathogen. 
Sharon, in contrast, begins her story within the elite environs as a microbiologist working for the 
OrganInc Compound, and escapes to enact radical environmentalist protests against commercial 
perversions of the science she helped to create.  
The characters of Sharon and Oryx are exercises in defining and redefining the feminine; the 
contested authority of claiming an identity frames both of their experiences, although they each 
have disparate concerns and goals. Sharon, as the doomed voice of ethical science, and Oryx, as 
the elusive exotic, challenge any notion of future egalitarianism; as Tolan observes, Atwood 
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“relinquishes the hope for a future generation of unified women” she displayed in earlier works 
(282). In discarding this vision, the machinations of corporatized empiricism become apparent, a 
commoditized perspective reducing all entities to a profit/loss valuation. The feminine, 
inherently linked to nature, is pictured as both tool and raw material in the world of Compound 
science. Sharon’s and Oryx’s individual deaths are mirrors to the larger cultural and species 
extinctions taking place in Oryx and Crake; their victimization to patriarchal motives of greed 
and control echoes the natural world’s exploitation by a humanist vision of progress.  
In viewing humans as apart from nature, Crake represents a common scientific trap, forgetting or 
ignoring that, regardless of the control they are exerting or the environmental damage they are 
causing, humans are part of the biosphere. “Crake’s logic,” Glover recognizes, “seems valid: if 
humans are responsible for destroying the world, then it makes sense to alter humans radically in 
order to ensure this destruction can no longer continue” (54). But Crake’s answer to human 
overpopulation, the JUVE epidemic, aims for cultural extinction as well as human extinction. 
Knowledge of literature, art, music, architecture, and even technology will disappear without any 
hope of rebuilding (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 223). The devolution of artistic culture, already in 
progress prior to the epidemic, is as devastating to the human animal as the JUVE virus. Jimmy, 
the word person, is already an evolutionary dead end in the pre-JUVE future world, and Ku 
questions whether “the rejected, despised, outcast Snowman,” ostracized from his own society 
for technological lack, is “still a human being at all?” (111). Is the human still human when 
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stripped of language and culture, or, as Cooke avers, is it impossible to “separate the human from 
the technical” (108)?36
After the plague, Snowman—the visible example of deteriorating humanity—is cut off from the 
things with which he self-identified, the “imaginative structures” that define “human meaning” 
(Atwood, Oryx and Crake 167).  Ku asserts that the transgenic constructs of pigoons and Crakers 
“disrupt or perhaps topple Snowman’s human status” (111), while DiMarco contends Snowman 
is “in a position of being able to reinvent a future world . . . one that may or may not be more 
attentive to caring for others” (187). Perhaps Jimmy/Snowman’s ambiguous presentation is 
Atwood’s means of calling our attention to technology’s invasive degradation of cultural 
artifacts, a warning that more than just organic entities are going extinct. The “gnawed bones and 
old bricks and ossified shit” that encroach artistic products for archaeological significance; the 
“erosion” of art, music, literature, and dance at the Martha Graham Academy; and the 
disappearance of words all signal contemporary clues (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 167, 187, 195). 
Human Re-Vision? 
In contemporary culture’s rush to achieve technoscientific nirvana, the assumption of human 
hierarchical prominence is often taken for granted. Atwood deconstructs this assumption by 
introducing others who fill the void opened by humanity’s extinction. Ku affirms “the pigoons’ 
and Crakers’ mimicry of human beings . . . disrupts this ranking system,” as the demise of 
humanity “enables the highly adaptable pigoons and the extremely refined Crakers to dethrone 
the merely ‘human’ Snowman” (112). Human exceptionalism in the absence of material culture 
                                                 
36 Wilson suggests “genetic evolution” runs along a “parallel track of cultural evolution,” and that “the two forms of 
evolution are somehow linked” (Consilience 130).  
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proves to be a hollow claim for Snowman, and “Life Skills” adapted to a technological world do 
not easily translate into survival skills in a globally-warmed, post-apocalyptic setting (Atwood, 
Oryx and Crake 42). The image of a bug-bitten Snowman, unshaven, unbathed, clad only in a 
dirty sheet, broken sunglasses, and baseball cap, is a stark physical contrast to the “amazingly 
attractive” Crakers (8). Furthermore, “lost in the fog” and drunk on bourbon (237-38), Snowman 
is nearly outmatched by the “Alert . . . on the lookout” pigoons (270).   
“Modernist versions of humanism and posthumanism alike,” contends Haraway, owe ideological 
allegiance to the divisions “between what counts as nature and as society, as nonhuman and as 
human” (When Species 9). Thus, efforts to cast pigoons and Crakers as posthumanist figures 
become problematic. Although pigoons share human organs, a feature Ku relates as 
“exchangeability” (113), and coordinate their behaviors in social groups, they still appear to us as 
nonhuman and of nature, not society. And while the Crakers may look like “a superhuman race” 
(Ku 115), their lack of common history and language, as well as their alien alimentation, 
reproduction, life span, and self-defense mechanisms, mark them as other. As Glover notes, 
“Crake thus takes a variety of features from the animal kingdom and designs a human that 
appears closer to nature, yet is ironically the product of a laboratory experiment” (55). The 
ambiguity of the Crakers’ complicated origins reanimates Jimmy and Crake’s old discussion: are 
they real or fabricated? And if they are real, are they human? 
Crake relates to Jimmy that the Crakers “were perfectly adjusted to their habitat, so they would 
never have to create houses or tools or weapons, or, for that matter, clothing. They would have 
no need to invent any harmful symbolisms, such as kingdoms, icons, gods, or money” (Atwood, 
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Oryx and Crake 305). This deliberate attempt to deconstruct human culture is undercut by 
Crake’s own latent humanism, though; for all Crake’s attempts to undo the humanist paradigm 
through physical alterations, residual evidence of cultural construction can be found in the 
Crakers. Bouson states that Crake uses appellations such as “Abraham Lincoln, Leonardo da 
Vinci, Madame Curie, Sojourner Truth . . . because it amuses him” (151), but it can also be seen 
as lingering cultural debris seeping into Crake’s Adamic role. The new humans in the new world 
will begin their communities with names salvaged from pre (for them) -history.  
The Crakers also remain suspect because of the enduring trace of human exceptionalism. Their 
bipedal locomotion and overall physical appearance, combined with basic human speech and an 
arguably human brain, locate them within anthropocentric expectations. The vanity of their 
creator, Crake, is evident in their green eyes, and the rest of their form follows aesthetic ideals, 
notwithstanding the extras he incorporated as survival insurance. As Snowman relates, they are 
“perfect, each one a different skin colour—chocolate, rose, tea, butter, cream, honey,” and “they 
were so beautiful . . . Each individual was exquisite” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 8, 302). If 
anything, Crake has merely extrapolated and codified species vanity for eugenic perfection. 
Through his actions, Atwood shows the futility of deconstructing humanism from a standpoint 
that has been saturated with humanist ideology from its inception.  
In a question conceived before the advent of transgenic manipulation, Berry asks “How much 
can we ‘modify’ the environment before we fatally ‘modify’ ourselves?” (205). The answers 
Atwood proposes are not reassuring; posing environmental, cultural, physical, and mental  
alterations, she illustrates the fragility of the construct called human. Contemporary worries over 
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GMOs are extrapolated into alarming scenarios with Oryx and Crake’s wolvogs, pigoons, snats, 
and bobkittens, and the manipulation of the human genome raises questions of when, and how, 
will we stop?  
Atwood ends the novel on an equally opaque note, with Snowman’s discovery of other human 
survivors. Three strangers are camped on the beach, but by now, despite his desperate loneliness, 
Snowman finds these humans embody the unknown: the other. Confused and afraid, the thoughts 
that come to him are  
Images from old history . . . sidebars from Blood and Roses: Ghengis Khan’s 
skull pile, the heaps of shoes and eyeglasses from Dachau, the burning corpse-
filled churches in Rwanda, the sack of Jerusalem by the Crusaders. The Arawak 
Indians, welcoming Christopher Columbus with garlands and gifts of fruit, 
smiling with delight, soon to be massacred, or tied up beneath the beds upon 
which their women were being raped. (366) 
Quite aware of his responsibility to the Crakers, he is faced with his unfortunate understanding of 
human nature; while the strangers portend a mystery, he can easily project their destructive potential. 
The once half-sighted Snowman has taken off his sheet and sunglasses, and awake, with clear vision, 
he approaches his “zero hour” encounter (374).  
Atwood’s deliberately ambivalent closure—the narrative ends before Snowman makes his 
move—invites participation from the reader. The open ending can be construed as a promise of 
renewed humanity or a new beginning (Cooke, DiMarco, Ku); it can also be seen as a warning 
against technoscientific vanity and the dangers of transgenic experimentation (Bouson, DiMarco, 
Glover). I agree it is a warning, an example of Rigby’s call to prophetic imagination: now we 
may be implicated in our own extinction, not just from a misanthropic Crakish genius, but from 
our neglect and abuse of the living earth. In addition, though, Atwood is asserting the biological 
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human, and through her discourse on evolution and extinction, establishing humanity as a part 
of, not apart from, the organic mix.  
In 1978, Dr. Paul Abell uncovered a fossilized set of footprints in Laetoli, Tanzania, evidence of 
at least two hominids who walked across the wet sand of a lake shore “between 3.6 and 3.8 
million years” ago (White 175). The footprints are attributed to Australopithecus afarensis, a 
“geographically and ecologically widespread, bipedal, megadont, small-brained hominid species 
lineage” (White, et al. 883). To paleoanthropologists, the footprints, together with bones, give 
evidence of existence, just as the footprints Snowman finds provide evidence “of his own kind” 
(Atwood, Oryx and Crake 372). For much of the novel, Atwood reveals Snowman as a less than 
substantial figure, “existing and not existing,” “known only through rumours and . . . backward-
pointing footprints” (7-8), but by “stamp[ing] his own good foot into the wet sand” (373), he 
firmly establishes his own undeniable physical existence. The Australopithecines walked upright, 
like us; whether or not they were ancestral is not significant. What is significant is the fact there 
were many branches of the proto, near, and ancestral hominids that went extinct, pointing to the 
temporality of species life, even human species life. If the rules of the game were changed to 
include the distant past, the various hominids would be game points in Extinctathon, just as 
Homo sapiens sapiens becomes after JUVE (344). Atwood reminds us that evolution and 
extinction are not static, but ongoing processes, and humans, as biological entities, are included 
in the system. 
The Crakers are evolving, expressing emotions and constructing icons. Emoting when 
Snowman returns from his journey to Paradice, “All are smiling happily; the children jump up 
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and down, laughing; some of the women clap their hands with excitement.” They are 
developing rituals—playing percussive instruments and chanting—and displaying “Symbolic 
thinking,” as made evident in their material representation of Snowman (361). Nevertheless, 
although they display what may signify an anthropogenic predilection toward religion, it is 
stamped with a new ethos: following the “teaching of Oryx” in an emerging ecological 
spirituality, they dismantle their art, returning it “to its place of origin” (363). Snowman feels 
“he himself has been torn apart and scattered” through this de-composition, and originary 
humanist approaches are dissembled and recast.  
Snowman is evolving, too. His perception of nature is changing, perhaps indicating biophilic 
inculcation. The beginning of the last chapter mirrors the first, but whereas he originally only 
perceived the “rosy, deadly glow” that “still seems tender,” he now “gazes at it with rapture.” 
Even though the birds’ cries still “sound like nothing human,” he now recognizes the sublime 
natural beauty of the world (3, 371). The butchered rakunk the strangers are cooking elicits 
empathic feelings, now appearing as a “poor creature” to him rather than a pest (373). Tellingly, 
his empathy toward the Crakers has also grown, as his first impulse upon his return is to visit and 
reassure them (359), and his chief concerns over the response of the strange humans is how they 
will behave toward the Crakers. How will he “present[ ] the Crakers to them in the proper light” 
to ensure their understanding (366)? Furthermore, he worries that he cannot explain the dangers 
of human contact to the innocents, recognizing the impossibility of describing concepts of 
colonialism, slavery, abuse, and rape with the available language tools. Finally, Snowman begins 
to realize he is cared for in return by the Crakers: “He feels himself being lifted gently, carried, 
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lifted again, carried again, held” (367). Snowman’s re-humanization signals the beginning of his 
adaptation to the post-apocalyptic world. 
On his way to meet the strangers, Snowman reiterates “An old conundrum of Crake’s”: “Can a 
single ant be said to be alive . . . or does it only have relevance in terms of its anthill?” (371). A 
following question might be can a single human be said to be human? Or does he/she only retain 
humanity in terms of a social group? Snowman’s humanity is seemingly revivified in the context 
of the developing Craker social unit, and although his blank-faced watch indicates the absence of 
human-imposed order on the world, it may also signal a timeless opportunity for reanalyzing 
human relationships with the rest of the biosphere. Jimmy/Snowman, the master story-teller, 
“ma[kes] a narrative mistake” recounting his journey to the Crakers, an error that engenders a 
sense of unbalance (362); his loss of balance encapsulates all that has proceeded in Oryx and 
Crake’s human interactions with the biosphere. In Negotiating with the Dead, Atwood explains 
the longevity and mutability of the oral story: “An orally transmitted tale does not die with the 
teller,” but it “changes from teller to teller” (50). In Oryx and Crake, a world devoid of written 
texts, stories once again become changeable and adaptable. Perhaps Atwood is signaling the 
need for a new, adaptive narrative, wherein the post-human signifies an organism integrated into 
its ecosystem rather than an intellectual singularity. This potential narrative promises a consilient 
and ecological rendering of humanity: a survival guide in which animality and imagination share 
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